Iranian Kurds as regional actors: opportunities and prospects

Like many other ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, the Kurds are also victims of the unsuccessful (or thwarted) and protracted transition from empires to nation-states. After a century of tragic struggle, they achieved semi-autonomous status in Iraq. Despite having established independent political entities in Iran for a brief period and waging a guerrilla war for several decades, the political aspirations of Iranian Kurds have not been successful. Depending on how the war currently raging in Iran (which began on 28 February 2026) unfolds, and whether the Kurds are prepared to bear the high costs of the struggle against the dying but stubborn Islamic regime, the Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy or independence in Iran may eventually come to fruition. In this paper, we provide a brief overview of the demographic, military and political significance of Iranian Kurds, as well as how the situation of Iraqi and Syrian Kurds influences and affects Iranian Kurds. After that, we will examine how they are reacting to the war in Iran. We conclude this analysis by examining possible scenarios for the future of Iranian Kurds.

Strives for independence and limited military capabilities

Kurds make up approximately 8–17% of Iran’s population (7–15 million people); most are Sunni[1] and live primarily in the mountainous regions of northwestern Iran, along the border with Turkey and Iraq.[2] Geographically, we can, therefore, see a contiguous and isolated region that the Kurds have, and continue to regard, as an entity distinct from the Iranian state. In addition, Iranian Kurds have close ethnic and economic ties with the Kurds in neighboring Iraq and Turkey, who support their aspirations for autonomy or independence. The Kurds in Iran have been building their own institutions for hundreds of years, strengthening their political aspirations and their sense of identity as a distinct people with their own language and distinctive local culture, even though they are one of Iran’s ethnic groups, albeit not Persians. The empires that previously ruled Iran (particularly the Safavid and Qajar empires) recognised the Kurds’ distinctiveness, but their integration into the nation-state system under the Pahlavi and Islamic regimes oppressed the Kurds, though these regimes were unable to suppress their aspirations.[3]

Since 1918, the Kurds have been involved in a political conflict with the Iranian government in their quest for autonomy or independence. Due to the numerous uprisings and waves of protests, this is the longest-running conflict—lasting 108 years. From the 14^th century until 1865, the Kurds of western Iran were ruled by Ardalanid Kurdistan, a hereditary Kurdish emirate that functioned for a time as either an independent state or an autonomous entity within the Safavid Empire. In 1946, the Kurds succeeded in establishing the Republic of Mahabad, a state supported by the Soviet Union and led by Qazi Muhammad, but it collapsed in 1947 following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Both Islamic Iran (1979–) and, before it, Pahlavi Iran (1925–1979) killed thousands of Kurds, denied them political and cultural rights and established a state dominated by Persian Shia Islam.[4] In this way, the Kurds in Iran have been able to maintain their determination and organisation long enough to assert their political rights and join any emerging political project aimed at autonomy or independence.

The main question is whether the Kurds in Iran are capable of turning their political resolve into military strength and taking part in the war in Iran. The current strength of the Iranian Kurdish forces (4,000–5,000 Iranian Kurdish fighters are stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan and are armed only with light weapons) does not pose a serious challenge to the Revolutionary Guard, which possesses a sophisticated arsenal.[5] In an effort to address this shortcoming, the CIA is working to supply Iranian Kurdish fighters with more advanced weapons.[6] Organisations of Iranian Kurds such as the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan – KSZK), a social-democratic Kurdish political organisation founded in 1969, and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) have strong networks in western Iran and have previously engaged in minor skirmishes with Iranian security forces.[7] Israel is carrying out deliberate attacks against Iranian forces in western Iran in order to destroy a large portion of their forces and to pave the way for a Kurdish-led, smaller-scale ground operation. [8]

Relations between the Kurds of Iran, Syria and Iraq

Iranian Kurds were an important component of the SDF forces in Syria. Both Iran and the United States encouraged this role: Iran drove Iranian Kurds out of the Iranian mountains and then drove them into Syria, while the United States needed every available Kurdish fighter to control oil reserves and secure the Iraqi border during the Syrian civil war. Ultimately, this became a weakness for the SDF, because the new Syrian government insisted on negotiating only with Syrian Kurds, but not with Iranian Kurds. The new Syrian government has announced a policy to integrate Syrian Kurdish fighters into the Syrian army and grant them greater political and cultural rights, which was the only realistic option for the Syrian Kurds. They agreed to the creation of a centralised and unified Syrian state, and it is unlikely that they will play a role in the war in Iran, as such involvement would further undermine the gains they have achieved.[9]

The Kurdish regions of Iran and Iraq share a border, and historically, Kurds involved in uprisings in either country have always sought refuge in the neighbouring region. As a result, Iranian and Iraqi Kurds have formed a military and political alliance that has lasted for decades. Currently, the divided, weak, and small Iranian Kurdish militias have found refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has enjoyed semi-autonomous status and significant oil revenues since 2003.[10] If Iranian Kurds launch a ground operation in Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan will likely provide fighters, funds and weapons to the militias. Furthermore, if Iranian Kurds gain autonomy or independence, this would also facilitate the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan or its unification with Iranian Kurds, which would undoubtedly benefit Iraqi Kurds, who are wealthier, better organised and likely to lead any future Kurdish state. [11]

Kurds in the current war in Iran

At the start of the war in Iran, the U.S. government began referring to Iraqi-based Iranian Kurdish militias as potential allies in a ground invasion of Iran. In addition, Iranian Kurds actively supported the Israeli and American campaign during the 12-day war (by providing intelligence and logistical assistance). They also took part in the most recent protests against the regime in January 2026. It is clear that the United States and Israel support this kind of armed intervention by the Kurds in order to open a new front against the Iranian regime. At first, the Kurdish militias were reluctant to join the fight, as they had not been involved in combat for decades; other factors also contributed to their hesitation, such as the failure of Syrian Kurds to achieve autonomy, as well as the Revolutionary Guard’s toughness and sophisticated weaponry.

However, for two main reasons, their intervention seems unavoidable. On the one hand, Iran and its allied Iraqi Shia militias are launching daily missile and drone attacks against Iraqi Kurdish militias in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.[12] These attacks have enraged Iraqi and Iranian Kurds, so if the opportunity arises, a response against the Revolutionary Guard is likely. On the other hand, the United States is currently considering a ground intervention to secure enriched uranium and gain control of the Strait of Hormuz, rather than relying solely on airstrikes and maximum pressure. This is significant because only a ground invasion can reach Isfahan, the site of enriched uranium storage, which would require a ground invasion from the west. Within Iran, the Kurds are currently the only group capable of launching a military campaign.[13]

Three possible scenarios for the future of Iranian Kurds

Taking all factors into account, particularly the Revolutionary Guard’s remaining, rigid and uncompromising leaders, three scenarios seem possible:

Independence: If the United States and Israel fail to bring about regime change in Iran, they may attempt to divide Iran into smaller states. Thanks to their past political experience and the support from Iraqi Kurds, the Kurds have the best chance of establishing an independent state in Iran. Geographically, this scenario is possible, as Iraqi Kurdistan provides a secure backdrop for Iranian Kurdistan; however, due to significant obstacles, it is unlikely to materialise:

Iranian Kurds are cautious because experience in Syria shows that the U.S. may let the Kurds down if a geopolitical situation more favourable to the Americans arises. Iraqi Kurds also tried to achieve independence, but they failed because the U.S. did not give them the green light.
Since an Iranian Kurdish state has a direct impact on the Kurds in Turkey, Turkey will not allow such a state to be established and will use all its influence to prevent it.
Unlike the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, Iranian Kurdish territories are located in mountainous regions with few natural resources, much like Syrian Kurds, who are also divided into two remote areas. As a result, they would have to rely economically on Iraqi Kurdistan and, possibly, on assistance from the United States and Israel.
Iranian Persians and the Islamic regime have responded brutally to the Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy or independence, so significant human sacrifices will have to be made before such a state can be established.[14]

Autonomy, aka the Iraqi scenario: a federal Iran operating under a new regime (whether a monarchy or a republic led by the People’s Mujahedin Organisation of Iran) may be the most likely scenario in the medium or long term. This option would require a ground campaign in western Iran, in which Kurdish forces would have to fight with air support from the United States and Israel. In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan would have to provide financial and military support to achieve this result. This scenario would be welcomed by the Arab Gulf states in the region, as it weakens Iran and maintains the United States’ security umbrella over the region, ensuring that none of them faces destabilisation. Both Israel and Turkey may support the formation of a federal Iran, as this would reduce the threat posed by Iran.[15]

The third scenario is the Syrian model, in which a new central government comes to power and adjusts its policies to better take into account the rights of Iranian minorities, but without introducing federalism. This could guarantee cultural rights for the Kurds, increase their political participation, and establish a recognised regional identity for them within Iranian society. However, Syria differs from Iran in terms of geography and history, as well as in terms of the proportion of its Kurdish population. At the same time, it is unlikely that Iranian Kurds would fight for such a meager outcome, and Israel would not consider this a satisfactory result either, as it would further strengthen the Iranian state.[16]

Conclusion

From a geographical and historical perspective, Iranian Kurds meet the conditions for autonomy—if not independence. Their current role appears to be indispensable to any initiative aimed at regime change or the conduct of ground operations designed to seize enriched uranium and effectively halt Iran’s nuclear programme. However, autonomy or independence is difficult to achieve in the short or even medium term, given the significant regional and economic challenges, as well as the high economic costs of this war. In addition, Iranian Kurdish militias must engage in a long and bloody conflict in order to achieve autonomy or independence.

Summary—Iranian Kurds as regional actors: opportunities and prospects

Initial situation and historical background

The Kurds are one of the largest stateless people in the Middle East
Iran: around 7-15 million people (8-17%), mainly in the northwest
The majority are Sunni, while the state of Iran is Shia → structural tension
More than 100 years of conflict with the Iranian state
A key historical point:
- Mahabad Republic (1946-47), a short-lived independent state
Modern regimes in Iran → political and cultural repression