The EU and Illegal Migration: Challenges and Solutions Following Hungarian Initiatives

The EU’s Migration Pact adopted an explicitly strict policy on returning migrants. However, since the Pact came into force in 2024, EU member states have not met expectations regarding the return of migrants to their home countries. To supplement the EU’s Migration Pact, the European Commission submitted the Return Regulation to the European Parliament in March 2025, intended to provide a legal framework for return centers. The European Parliament approved the proposal on March 26, after the Council of Ministers decided on the general strategy in December 2025. EU representatives are currently negotiating the final stages of the legislative procedure. This regulation will allow governments, prior to expulsion, to send rejected asylum seekers and illegal migrants — including families with children — to hubs outside the EU, that is, to “return centers.”

Normalization of the Go-It-Alone Approach

Political convergence forms through administrative practice, legislative adaptation, and political normalization. This is exactly what has happened with EU migration policy since 2015. Border infrastructure is the most striking example. Hungary erected the first fence in 2015, for which it was condemned and criticized. By December 2023, the EU’s external land borders were already covered by 1,522 kilometers of physical barriers — representing 16 percent of the total length of the external land border — most of it built after 2015. The list of states that have since built or expanded fences is as follows: Bulgaria (235 km), Latvia (457 km), Lithuania (595 km), Poland (186 km), Greece (49.5 km, with a further 135 km planned), Estonia (69 km, with a further 90 km planned), and Finland (3 km, with a further 197 km planned). With its 158-km fence, Hungary is now just one among many, rather than an exception.

Mass pushbacks, once widely condemned when Hungary was their primary practitioner, have become routine across the entire bloc. A 2025 report compiled by nine human-rights organizations documented more than 120,000 pushback cases at the EU’s external and internal borders in 2024.[1] Bulgaria alone registered more than 52,000 cases, followed by Greece (14,482), Poland (13,600), Hungary (5,713), Latvia (5,388), Croatia (1,905), and Lithuania (1,002). What was once attributed to Budapest’s ideological go-it-alone approach has become the European operational norm.

The reintroduction of internal Schengen border controls — once applied only in crises and exceptional situations — has similarly become almost routine. Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden have all introduced temporary controls, citing migration and security pressures. Austria has maintained controls in various forms since 2015 on its borders with Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, repeatedly citing as legal grounds “pressure on the asylum system.”[2]

Externalization — that is, the transfer of border and migration control to non-EU states through financial and political agreements — has accelerated at the institutional level. The 2016 EU-Turkey statement, the 2023 Tunisia partnership agreement, and the ongoing agreements with Libya and Morocco all reflect the logic of “outsourcing” migration management, something Hungary has long considered the only sustainable approach.[3]

A broader ideological shift can be observed in the political development of states once identified with liberal asylum policy. Denmark, under successive governments, has declared all refugee protection to be temporary, favoring return over integration. In 2023, an asylum appeals board ruled that certain parts of Syria could be considered safe for return. Sweden, long regarded as the standard-bearer of the EU’s welcoming policy, introduced comprehensive legislative restrictions following the 2022 change of government. The camp of restrictionists, once confined to a minority within the Visegrád bloc, increasingly reflects the European mainstream.[4]

Disagreements and Challenges Regarding the EU’s Return Regulation

Some of the disagreements are semantic in nature — for example, over the interpretation of the concept of “voluntary return” — while others are political, such as the EU-wide mutual recognition of expulsion decisions.[5] Since it is the executive authorities of the member states that decide on accepting or rejecting asylum applications, the lack of coordination represents the biggest challenge for EU member states. As a result, the EU provides only a framework for legal coordination, not for procedural coordination. The real problems will have to be resolved in each individual state, though primarily among neighboring countries within the EU. In addition, we can expect that a migrant whose asylum application has been rejected in one country, and who has been placed in a return center, may attempt to seek asylum in another country. Acceptance or rejection rates may then fluctuate depending on the orientation and policy of the government in question. This problem can be addressed if EU member states create a database of rejected applications and, through political agreement, reject the asylum applications of persons who have already been rejected previously, regardless of the reason for rejection. Further points of contention among the negotiating parties include the duration of the entry ban imposed on expelled migrants, investigative powers, and the extent to which migration policy should be integrated into the EU’s external relations.[6]

Few countries openly and enthusiastically support implementing the policy of return centers; among them, Germany and the Netherlands stand out. Germany views “return centers” outside the EU as a further tool for limiting and deterring future immigration into the bloc. As German Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt put it: “The purpose of these [centers] is to show that entering Germany does not necessarily come with the possibility of staying, if the country of origin does not cooperate with us” — adding that negotiations are underway with various EU member states on setting up such centers, and that “agreements are expected to be concluded by the end of the year.”[7]

Germany currently faces the problem of having granted asylum to approximately 1.2 million Syrians over the past ten years, a quarter of whom have already acquired German citizenship. Chancellor Friedrich Merz intends to return 80 percent of the Syrians living in Germany to their home country within the next three years.[8] Germany and the new Syrian government have reached a vague agreement on the return of Syrian migrants who have not yet obtained a residence permit or citizenship — roughly 900,000 people. This, however, requires both the willingness of the Syrian government to take them in and the willingness of Syrian migrants to return, which is unlikely. Under the German plan, the return centers would serve as a bridge, allowing expelled Syrians to go to these centers, after which it would be up to them whether they return home or not. The Syrian government, however, is unable to create favorable economic conditions to encourage Syrians to return, and this is unlikely to happen for the current generation regardless. Even if some success is achieved, living conditions in Syria cannot match those in Germany. As a result, most Syrians will not choose to return. This is also indicated by the fact that, despite the incentives, only 3,678 Syrians returned home from Germany in 2025.[9]

Another challenge to consider is which European country will set up the return centers, how much funding the project will require, and who will run these foreign centers. So far, the EU has rejected setting up such centers as EU facilities. Every European state must find its own solution, or a group of states must cooperate in establishing return centers. In theory, several EU countries have already agreed to cooperate in setting up return centers outside the EU. The Netherlands is coordinating cooperation with Denmark, Greece, Germany, and Austria. The Netherlands is also negotiating with Sweden, Denmark, and Malta on assessing asylum applications outside the EU before refugees enter Europe.[10]

A difficulty already arising is which countries would be willing to host these European return centers. The plan is to build these facilities in non-EU countries in North Africa (mainly Egypt or Tunisia) and in the Western Balkan states, given their proximity to Europe and their cooperation with the EU on migration. Albania is a leading candidate because of its agreement with Italy, but as a small country, and given difficulties with corruption and border control, it would not be able to take in several hundred thousand people. Other options may include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and North Macedonia, all of which are seeking closer ties with the EU and are home to important transit routes. Partnership with sub-Saharan African countries is also possible.[11]

The Limits of Political Convergence

The changes that have taken place in EU migration policy over the past decade illustrate a phenomenon well known to students of European integration: the capacity of organized resistance to reshape norms through sustained rule-breaking and political pressure — without formal institutional acceptance. Hungary’s migration policy was not adopted through persuasion or negotiation. It became embedded in the EU mainstream through political efforts, electoral pressure, and the evident failure of alternative approaches. This signals a structural incoherence at the heart of the EU’s migration framework. The policy tools enshrined in the 2024 Pact — flexible solidarity, accelerated border-control procedures, an expanded designation of safe third countries — reflect the logic that Hungary represented. For European migration management, this comes with costs that are less openly acknowledged, in a framework whose normative foundations have shifted toward the restrictionist camp, even as it sanctioned the state most closely identified with that very approach.

Conclusion

The Return Regulation is a significant step toward an effective return policy aimed at sending illegal migrants home. Partly because of a lack of political will, and partly because of a lack of coordination among EU member states, current deportation rates and numbers are extremely low. A legal framework such as the Return Regulation facilitates coordination efforts, although the establishment and operation of return centers depends on the political will of both host countries and EU member states. Return centers could reduce illegal immigration in the short term. The key to an effective return policy may lie in integrating return centers into the local economy and culture of the host countries.

The EU and Illegal Migration: Challenges, Return Policy, and the Normalization of the Hungarian Go-It-Alone Approach

The EU’s 2024 Migration Pact and the 2025 Return Regulation represent a radical turnaround: the Hungarian migration model, considered marginal for a decade, has by 2026 become the European norm. This summary reviews the most important developments, the limits of return policy, and the open questions.

Normalization of the Go-It-Alone Approach

What counted as a scandal in 2015 had become the European standard by 2026. This shift can be traced in three areas:

Fences and border infrastructure:

2015 – Hungary: First to build — was condemned for it

By 2023, 1,522 km of physical barriers covered the EU’s external land borders (16 percent of the total border length).

Builders: Bulgaria (235 km), Latvia (457 km), Lithuania (595 km), Poland (186 km), Greece, Estonia, Finland.

With its 158-km fence, Hungary is now just one among many.

Mass Pushbacks:

More than 120,000 pushback cases at EU borders in 2024 (joint report by 9 NGOs)

Bulgaria: 52,000+ cases — by far the most

Greece: 14,482 | Poland: 13,600 | Hungary: 5,713

What once seemed like Hungary’s ideological go-it-alone approach is now the European operational norm

Internal Schengen Border Controls:

Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden — all have introduced them

Austria has maintained controls continuously since 2015

Legal grounds: “pressure on the asylum system” — the same argument Hungary used previously

Key observation: Political convergence did not come about through persuasion, but through electoral pressure and the evident failure of alternatives. The EU sanctioned the state whose model it ultimately adopted.

The Return Regulation — What Does It Deliver, What Does It Not Solve?

Submitted by the European Commission in March 2025, adopted by the EP on March 26. Creates a legal framework for return centers outside the EU.

What does it allow?

Rejected asylum seekers and illegal migrants — including families with children — can be sent to hubs outside the EU

Temporary placement in a third country prior to deportation

A legal coordination framework for previously fragmented member-state practices

What doesn’t it help with?

Lack of procedural coordination — acceptance/rejection remains a member-state decision

A rejected applicant can reapply in another member state

Solution: a joint EU database of rejected applications — does not yet exist

Points of contention: duration of entry bans, investigative powers, integrating migration into the EU’s external relations, interpretation of “voluntary return”

Return Centers — Who, Where, How?

Supporters:

Germany: entry into the EU does not guarantee a right to stay — Interior Minister Dobrindt

Netherlands: coordinates the Denmark-Greece-Germany-Austria coalition

Sweden, Malta: negotiations underway on pre-screening asylum applications outside the EU

Possible locations:

North Africa: Egypt, Tunisia — proximity to the EU, existing partnerships

Western Balkans: Albania (Italian precedent), Bosnia, Serbia, North Macedonia

Sub-Saharan Africa: potential, but weak coordination capacity

The German Case — Lessons:

~1.2 million Syrians granted asylum over the past 10 years, 25 percent already German citizens

Chancellor Merz: would return 80 percent of Syrians within 3 years

In 2025, only 3,678 Syrians voluntarily returned home from Germany

Conclusion: voluntary return remains marginal despite incentives