The Causes of the Illegal Migration Wave in Ceuta

Ceuta as a Migration Destination

Ceuta is a Spanish city located in North Africa, on the Strait of Gibraltar. It covers an area of 18.5 km² and has a population of 84,222, roughly half of whom are Moroccan and half Spanish. The distance between Ceuta and the Spanish mainland is 17 kilometers, while its land border with Morocco is 6.4 kilometers long.[1] Morocco has disputed Ceuta’s status since gaining independence from Spain and France in 1956, but has taken a pragmatic approach and has not tried to pressure Spain (a NATO member since 1982), since the economic and political benefits it derives from Spain are more significant to it than reclaiming 18.5 km² of territory. Morocco’s territory covers 710,850 km², including 3,500 km of coastline: 500 km on the Mediterranean and 3,000 km along the Atlantic Ocean.[2] The importance of Spain’s role for Morocco is well illustrated by the fact that more than 1.1 million Moroccans live in Spain, sending significant sums in remittances to Morocco and playing a defining role in the economic relations between the two countries.[3]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceuta#/media/File:Ceuta_en.png 

Timing

During Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s visit to Algeria (July 20, 2026) and in the days that followed, more than 1,500 illegal migrants suddenly arrived in Ceuta, many of them minors. On July 30, Juan Jesús Vivas, the city’s mayor and president, asked the Spanish government to declare a national state of emergency. The exact number of deaths and arrivals varies by source. While Spanish authorities officially confirmed 72 deaths,[4] Ceuta’s Institute of Legal Medicine put the figure at 79.[5] According to some reports, the number of arrivals reached 72,000 within 24 hours.[6] The residents of Ceuta — both Moroccans and Spaniards — watched the events in horror, since the city lacks facilities capable of housing a number of asylum seekers comparable to the city’s own population.[7] On August 3, Ceuta’s authorities registered 862 unaccompanied minors, while the city’s official reception capacity is sufficient for only 29 people, so they requested that most of them be transferred to the Spanish mainland.[8]

Geopolitical Context

The current case is not without precedent. In May 2021, a similar but smaller-scale influx (around 8,000-9,000 people) occurred in Ceuta and Melilla, after Spain admitted the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, for medical treatment, which Rabat treated as a matter of sovereignty and trust.[9] During the 2026 incident, Moroccan authorities vacated certain checkpoints and made no serious effort to stop the migrants. The illegal migrants were gathered by people smugglers following what was presumably a centrally directed disinformation campaign claiming that it was possible to cross into Ceuta without serious consequences.[10]

The purpose of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s visit to Algeria was to build a strategic, economic, and political partnership in energy and other economic areas, as well as to strengthen political relations between Spain and Algeria after many years of frosty relations.[11] By contrast, Spain and Morocco have maintained a long-standing privileged relationship in recent times. In Rabat, any move toward Algeria — Morocco’s regional geopolitical rival — is seen as aggressive and as destabilizing to a long-established balance.

Algeria sells gas to Spain through the Medgaz subsea gas pipeline connecting Algeria and Spain, currently without competition. Morocco intends to supply gas to Spain via the Nigeria-Morocco Atlantic Gas Pipeline, which is currently under construction. Because of the conflicts in Iran and Ukraine, Algerian gas is now considered a key resource by European buyers. For this reason, Algeria hopes to gain political benefits from increasing its gas supply to Spain, while Morocco will consequently suffer political losses. The Western Sahara question ultimately lies at the heart of the Moroccan-Algerian rivalry, and in recent years Spain has supported Morocco. From Rabat’s perspective, any change in the region’s geopolitical situation will also affect the Western Sahara question.

“Pull” Factors

In this context, two pull factors deserve particular attention. The first is that in February 2026, Spain began the mass legalization of illegal immigrants. 1.2 million illegal immigrants submitted legalization applications, and more than 600,000 applicants were admitted into the process. Most of these illegal immigrants come from Latin America, with 13 percent from Morocco, 3 percent from Algeria, and 2 percent from Senegal.[12] In early July 2026, Spain’s Supreme Court ruled that “migrants arriving by swimming do not cross the border-security threshold that is a legal requirement for carrying out an accelerated expulsion without opening an individual case file.”[13] Spain’s Supreme Court also confirmed the government’s obligation to provide immediate care for unaccompanied foreign minors found on the country’s territory.[14]

In early August 2026, radio station Cadena SER, citing anonymous sources linked to state security, reported that CNI intelligence had warned the Interior Ministry on several occasions in the weeks before the crisis broke out about the risk of a mass influx from Morocco. According to these sources, the Spanish Supreme Court’s July 8 ruling was identified as the turning point that opened an “administrative blind spot” and triggered a “pull effect” exploited by smuggling networks. According to the same sources, the ministry failed to take meaningful action despite the warnings, since the Ceuta border was “under-equipped in terms of security resources.”[15]

The lesson to be drawn from this is that any mass naturalization, status regularization, or legal procedure encouraging migration attracts masses of illegal immigrants, and can even trigger panic-like movements among participants who mistakenly believe that Europe welcomes them because of these measures. Just as Merkel’s “Willkommenskultur” principle contributed to the 2015 refugee crisis, Spain repeated this mistake eleven years later. At the same time, anti-immigration groups and views have gained strength in Spain, so Pedro Sánchez’s left-wing government faces an enormous challenge, one that could even cost it defeat in the May 2027 elections.[16] Twenty-two EU member states, in a joint letter, called Spain’s legalization policy a “pull factor.” Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis called migration a “geopolitical coercion tool” and urged a temporary tightening of asylum procedures.[17] The current Ceuta migration crisis once again reminded EU leaders that migration is a serious issue that can pose a security threat and sharpen internal conflicts of interest, even though Italy’s proposal to suspend Spain’s Schengen membership ultimately failed to gain support at the emergency meeting of interior ministers convened by Ireland’s EU presidency on August 4.[18]

Driving Forces

The primary driving force behind migration to Ceuta (and to Europe in general) is the “El Dorado” myth, which has led many young people to believe that Europe offers a quick and easy way out of their problems. Most of those who swam to Ceuta are either minors or young people around 20 years old, who dropped out of school, could not find work, and fell victim to the “European utopia.” In such a crowd there are always troublemakers and petty criminals as well, who are unsuited to any work or decent life and simply wanted to flee.[19]

Although the state also bears some responsibility for the fact that these young people are exploited by human trafficking networks, ultimately it is the failed social culture that is responsible, insofar as migration is seen as a quick and easy path to material success. Most of these young people returned home after learning that Ceuta had rejected them and offered them neither work nor any form of assistance. In some parts of Morocco, an irrational social culture favors rapid social advancement over the means of achieving that goal. This trend can be observed in other parts of the Mediterranean and beyond, where drug trafficking and illegal economic activities are seen as the key to getting rich. This is especially true for low-education families living on the outskirts of cities or in rural border areas. Morocco trains 11,000 engineers each year, but sends ten times as many illegal migrants to Europe.[20] About 250,000 people work in Morocco’s automotive industry, which produces one million cars a year. Despite this, more than 2.3 million people (out of a population of 38.7 million) live below the poverty line.[21]

Most of the young people who find it difficult to study or learn a trade consider emigration easier because of Spain’s proximity. At the same time, three important economic sectors in Morocco — construction, hospitality, and agriculture — suffer from labor shortages. These are precisely the sectors that employ young men, yet these young men would rather go to Spain. The Moroccan state has neglected this young, unskilled group for decades. As a neoliberal economy (supervised by the IMF since the 1980s) and in the absence of social policies, the Moroccan state does not provide for the illiterate, the unskilled, or those unwilling to work or study. The unemployed and uneducated are not part of any national strategy, since resources are directed toward the skilled middle class and the working class employed in industry and agriculture. For the Moroccan state, getting rid of this unskilled, uneducated, and unemployed group offers a double benefit. They no longer pose a problem, and after leaving, they strengthen the Moroccan economy through remittances.

Summary

The new migration crisis that unfolded in Ceuta highlights Europe’s vulnerability, as well as the complex factors that led to the sudden, massive influx of about 60,000 people into Spain. In particular, it undermines optimistic views regarding migration to Europe and exposes the weaknesses of EU migration policy, including the shortcomings of the Migration and Asylum Pact. While stricter border controls are essential, the use of migration for geopolitical purposes must be prevented and turned into a policy based on pressure and cooperation. Protecting European citizens and public safety must be made the priority of a sensible and practical migration policy. Illegal and mass migration is a foreign-policy tool repeatedly used by countries of the Global South, since uneducated and unskilled young people still view Europe as an El Dorado.

The Ceuta Migration Crisis

On July 31, 2026, approximately 72,000 people — predominantly young Moroccan men and minors — swam and crossed the 6.4-km land border and beach separating Ceuta from Morocco. The event was neither un precedented nor spontaneous: it resulted from a combination of geopolitical provocation, legal loopholes, and decades-old structural push factors.

Key figure: Of the 72,000 arrivals, 70,000 returned within a few days — after it became clear that neither work nor assistance awaited them in Ceuta.

Ceuta — the Location:

Ceuta is an 18.5 km² Spanish enclave in North Africa, on the southern side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Half of its residents are Moroccan, half Spanish. It lies 17 km from the Spanish mainland and 6.4 km from the Moroccan border.

• Between Ceuta and the Spanish mainland: 17 km of sea
• Land border shared with Morocco: 6.4 km
• Permanent population: 84,222
• Reception capacity: 29 minors — compared with the 862 unaccompanied minors registered on August 3

Morocco and Ceuta: Morocco has disputed Ceuta’s status since 1956, but has so far refrained from open pressure — the economic ties maintained with Spain (1.1 million Moroccans live in Spain, with significant remittances) are more valuable to it than reclaiming 18.5 km² of territory.

Timing and Geopolitical Background:

The crisis broke out directly after Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s visit to Algeria (July 20, 2026). The purpose of the visit was to build a strategic energy and political partnership with Algeria — Morocco’s regional rival.

The gas pipeline background

• Algeria: Medgaz subsea gas pipeline — already operating, supplies Spain
• Morocco: Nigeria-Morocco Atlantic Gas Pipeline — under construction, heading toward Spain
• Because of the wars in Iran and Ukraine, Algerian gas has become a strategic priority for Europe
• Spain’s rapprochement with Algeria is interpreted in Rabat as a political loss

The logic of Morocco’s reaction

• Moroccan authorities vacated certain checkpoints, did not obstruct those crossing
• A disinformation campaign preceded the event: “you can get through with impunity”
• Following the 2021 precedent (8,000-9,000 people to Ceuta and Melilla), Morocco again views migration pressure as a proven tool
• Targeted message: Spain should not deepen ties with Algeria

Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis: “Migration is a geopolitical coercion tool” — at the EU’s emergency meeting of interior ministers, August 4, 2026.

Pull Factors Behind the Crisis:

The Spanish legal loophole

• February 2026: Spain launches mass legalization — 1.2 million applications received, 600,000 admitted
• July 8, 2026: Spain’s Supreme Court rules that those arriving by swimming cannot be deported without an individual case file
• CNI repeatedly warned the Interior Ministry — no action was taken
• Twenty-two EU member states, in a joint letter, called Spain’s legalization policy a “pull factor”

Lesson: Any mass legalization or migration-encouraging legal decision can trigger panic-like movement — just as Merkel’s “Willkommenskultur” principle did in 2015, Spain repeated this mistake in 2026.

Push Factors: The El Dorado Myth and Structural Causes:

Most of the young people arriving in Ceuta are Moroccan men around 20 years old, who dropped out of school and could not find work. The El Dorado myth — the mistaken belief that Europe offers a quick and easy way out — mobilizes them.

• Morocco trains 11,000 engineers a year — but sends ten times as many illegal migrants to Europe
• 250,000 people work in the automotive industry, producing 1 million cars a year — yet 2.3 million live in poverty
• Construction, hospitality, and agriculture suffer from labor shortages — precisely the sectors that employ these young men
• Morocco’s neoliberal state model does not address unskilled, uneducated groups
• Emigrants’ remittances also benefit the Moroccan economy — the state has no interest in stopping them

Consequence: The crisis resolved itself within days. 70,000 people returned to Morocco after it became clear that Ceuta offered neither work nor assistance. The El Dorado myth proved short-lived — but the structural causes remain unchanged.