Capacity-building border support

What Is Capacity-Building Support Within the Pact’s System?

The Migration Pact’s solidarity mechanism (AMMR, EU 2024/1351) has three equivalent means of fulfillment: relocation of migrants, financial contribution, or capacity-building support. The regulation defines the latter as operational and technical assistance for member states particularly exposed to migration pressure — primarily Greece, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, and Spain.[1] Support may be provided in three forms: border-protection infrastructure (camps, equipment, surveillance systems), deployment of personnel (border guards, screening experts, interpreters, return coordinators), and transfer of equipment (vehicles, thermal-imaging systems, boats, drones). The three forms can be combined, and the Pact does not require that this take place through the Frontex channel — a bilateral member-state agreement is sufficient.[2] The Tisza government referred to this in June 2026 as an alternative to accepting quotas or making a financial payment. However, acceptance is at the Commission’s discretion, and approval is not automatic.

The Financing Architecture

Capacity-building support is not free for the offering member state, but the EU’s financial framework may reimburse the costs incurred, in part or in full. A formally submitted capacity-building contribution is not merely a gesture of solidarity, but an activity that can be financed through existing EU funding instruments.

BMVI — Border Management and Visa Instrument

The Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI, part of the Integrated Border Management Fund) has a budget of €7.92 billion for 2021-2027. It can finance: border-control infrastructure and equipment, training and expert exchange, the deployment of immigration liaison officers, and innovative technological solutions (drones, surveillance systems, biometric devices). The BMVI can also directly finance a situation where one member state builds capacity at another member state’s authorities — for example, the logistical and equipment costs of a Hungarian border-guard contingent working in Greece.[3]

AMIF — Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

The AMIF’s 2021-2027 budget is €9.88 billion. In connection with the solidarity mechanism, the AMIF finances relocation and capacity-building programs, emergency assistance in crisis situations, and the development of member states’ administrative capacities. National programs of member states can also be financed from the AMIF’s budget: if Hungary provides a capacity-building contribution, the related training and administrative costs can be reclaimed.[4]

ISF — Internal Security Fund

The ISF’s 2021-2027 budget is €1.93 billion. The ISF finances capacity-building against cross-border crime, police cooperation, and information exchange — this is directly relevant to bilateral police deployments of the Operation Fox type, where personnel and logistical costs can be covered from ISF funding.[5]

Frontex Reimbursement Mechanism

If the capacity-building contribution takes place through the Frontex channel (i.e., the deployed officer formally takes part in a Frontex deployment), Frontex fully reimburses all member states for the costs related to the deployment: per diem, accommodation, logistics, and use of equipment. This is why bilateral capacity-building and the Frontex channel are not necessarily alternatives, but can be combined.

IPA — Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (for capacity-building outside the EU)

If capacity-building support is directed toward a non-EU country (e.g., Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia), it is financed through the IPA III framework. Under the Western Balkans partnerships, a €36 million regional program was launched in 2023 for capacity-building against people smuggling, into which bilateral member-state actions can also be integrated.[6]

1. The Frontex Channel: The Best-Documented Model

Frontex is the backbone of the EU’s institutionalized capacity-building mechanism; however, it should be emphasized that the Pact does not require member states to fulfill their capacity-building contribution through Frontex. The Frontex channel is the best documented because it is subject to transparency obligations. Frontex operations take place along the EU’s entire external border — from the eastern borders through the Western Balkans to Greece and Cyprus, and on to Italy and Spain. The agency is also active in non-EU states: Moldova, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania. In 2026, it plans more than 30 joint operations with all member states.[7]

Greece — Operation Poseidon (2006-present)

Operation Poseidon has continuously covered the Eastern Mediterranean since 2006. In 2016, nearly 700 deployed officers worked with the participation of 23 EU and Schengen countries; currently 660 Frontex officers work alongside their Greek colleagues, with 16 vessels in the Aegean Sea.[8]

Italy — Operation Themis (2018-present)

Operation Themis supports Italy in the Central Mediterranean. In 2023, 41 percent of the EU’s irregular border crossings took place along this route (158,000 detections).[9] In January 2025, a Swedish patrol vessel — on a Frontex deployment — rescued a boat carrying 58 people without life jackets.[10]

Spain — Indalo, Hera, Minerva

Frontex maintains three parallel operations in Spain: Indalo (Western Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar), Hera (Canary Islands and West Africa), and Minerva (summer-season traffic at the ports of Ceuta and Algeciras). The Spanish case also demonstrates an important limitation: in January 2024, Frontex suspended its operations in Spain over a data-protection dispute, affecting about 350 officers and maritime and air assets. This illustrates that capacity-building cooperation depends on the consent of both parties.[11]

Western Balkans — Capacity-Building Outside the EU

Frontex launched its first full-scale operation outside the EU in Albania in 2019 (50 officers from 12 member states). Serbia has hosted a deployment since 2021 (44-87 officers from 14 member states). In Bosnia, more than 100 officers have been working since November 2025. As a result, illegal border crossings in the Western Balkans fell by 78 percent in 2024 compared with the previous year.[12]

2. Bilateral Capacity-Building — Without Frontex

Direct capacity-building cooperation between member states outside the Frontex channel is less well documented, but is a widely established practice within the EU. The examples below show that this model is already working — the Pact’s capacity-building solidarity option formalizes this existing practice and places it within a financing framework.

Estonia, Lithuania, Poland → Slovenia (2021)

In May 2021, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland sent police officers to the Slovenian-Croatian border for joint patrol duty with the Slovenian border police. Estonia delegated 5 officers, Lithuania 6, and Poland 10. This was a purely bilateral agreement outside Frontex — the three sending member states negotiated directly with the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior. This is one of the clearest precedents for how the Pact’s capacity-building solidarity can work in practice.[13]

Austria → North Macedonia and Serbia (2022-2023)

Austria sent around 25 police officers to Serbia, mainly to the Serbian-North Macedonian border, where they supported local border policing with thermal-imaging equipment, buses, and drones. Austria also committed to providing bilateral border-protection support along the North Macedonia-Greece border through the end of 2023. The Austrian interior minister described this border section as critical.[14]

Italy, Netherlands, Germany → Tunisia (2023)

In 2023, Italy handed over a coast-guard vessel to the Libyan coast guard. Toward Tunisia, alongside Italy, the Netherlands and Germany also took part in bilateral capacity transfer: offering equipment, training, and development assistance to strengthen the Tunisian coast guard and navy in exchange for curbing irregular migration movements. In this model, one member state provides equipment and training to a third country’s border authority.[15]

EU-Patrols Framework — Structured EU Police Capacity Exchange

The EU-Patrols project is a formalized, but non-Frontex, framework for EU police capacity transfer. In 2025, more than 550 joint patrols were carried out — officers of one member state working in another’s territory. At the 2024 Paris Olympics, 792 police officers were mobilized from 24 member states in a reinforcement role. At the 2023 Rugby World Cup, 89 officers arrived in France from 14 member states, including Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Malta. Although not migration-related, this is the same legal and organizational framework that also enables border-protection capacity-building contributions.[16]

Romania, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria → the Bulgarian-Turkish Border (2025)

For Bulgaria’s Schengen accession, a 100-strong multilateral team was set up with 40 Romanian, 15 Austrian, 20 Hungarian, and 25 Bulgarian border guards — with echolocation equipment and off-road vehicles. This was an ad hoc but structured member-state capacity-building operation, politically supported by the EU but not organized through the Frontex channel. Hungary contributed 20 border guards in reinforcing another member state’s external border.[17]

3. Hungarian-Related Precedents

Operation Fox — Austria Assists Hungary (2022-present)

This is the most important and best-documented bilateral precedent in which one member state carries out capacity-building border work on another member state’s territory, without a Frontex framework. Operation Fox began on the Austrian-Hungarian border on December 13, 2022. Under EU law, Austrian police officers may use force on Hungarian territory, provided a Hungarian officer is also present. In June 2024, about 32 Austrian police officers were deployed, with a peak strength of 70. The capacity provided by Austria: personnel, thermal-imaging vans, buses, drones — the AUTCON contingent is stationed on the Hungarian-Serbian border.[18] The results are reflected in the figures. When the operation began, thousands were crossing illegally each week; by August 2025 this figure had fallen to 74 per week. Arrests of people smugglers in Hungary fell from 166 in 2023 to 33 in 2024 and 12 in 2025. The Austrian interior minister praised the cooperation as an example of a durable model and indicated that it would be extended to the Romanian-Hungarian border as well.[19]

Hungary Assists Serbia (2023-present)

Hungary was not only a recipient, but itself built capacity in a non-EU member state. Hungarian police officers, working day and night in 12-hour shifts, patrol in pairs with Serbian colleagues directly on the Serbian side of the Serbian border, which is protected by a fence and cameras. The Hungarian government covers the accommodation costs of the roughly 35-strong contingent.[20]

In trilateral cooperation, Austrian and Hungarian police officers work together at the Serbian-Hungarian, Macedonian-Serbian, and Bulgarian-Turkish borders. The Orbán government promoted this as an EU best-practice model. Péter Magyar’s government will have to continue this cooperation at least in part, since this is precisely the kind of bilateral capacity-building activity on which the Pact’s solidarity contribution can be built.

Hungary in the 2010 RABIT Deployment — Greece

The 2010 RABIT deployment was the EU’s first rapid-reaction border-protection deployment, in Greece. Hungary took part as one of 26 member states: it provided 1 bus, 2 minibuses, 7 thermal-imaging vans, and 3 Schengen buses. This is the earliest documented example of Hungary actively contributing to the border-protection capacity of a burdened member state, and it is precisely this model that the Pact’s capacity-building solidarity formalizes.[21]

What Does This Mean for the Pact?

Hungary has been simultaneously a recipient (Operation Fox — Austria helped) and a sending state (Serbia, Bulgaria). Hungary is therefore not entering unfamiliar territory. An existing, proven bilateral logic would simply need to be incorporated into the Pact’s formal framework, since the 2010 deployment in Greece under RABIT, the police contingent in Serbia, and the multilateral reinforcement of the Bulgarian-Turkish border all demonstrate that Hungary has the necessary experience and resources.

Limits and Risks of the Mechanism

The capacity-building contribution is not the unconditional loophole that the Tisza government presents it as. There are two structural limitations that must be taken into account in negotiations.

4. The Commission’s Power of Assessment

Under Article 11(3) of the Pact’s AMMR, the Commission assesses and approves whether an offered capacity-building contribution is genuinely equivalent to relocation or a financial payment. This represents a political bargaining position for Hungary, but also uncertainty, since acceptance is not automatic and requires ongoing negotiation with the Commission.[22]

Political Disregard of the Hungarian Contribution

The European Commission’s 2025 migration report disregarded Hungary’s existing contribution to relieving the Balkan route — even though, according to Frontex data, in 2024 the Balkan route, with 21,520 arrivals, exceeded even the Western Mediterranean route’s 17,026 arrivals. This indicates that Hungary’s de facto contribution remains politically contested, and it is not certain that it would automatically be accepted as a capacity-building contribution.[23]

The Belarus Crisis as a Positive Model

The 2021 Polish-Belarusian border crisis was the first state-organized instance of migration pressure (an instrumentalization case) to which the EU responded with a coordinated capacity-building response: the deployment of 111 Frontex border guards to Lithuania and Latvia, and €200 million in immediate financial support to the three affected member states. This was the first case in which the crisis-response mechanism was paired with financial capacity-building.[24]

Summary and Conclusions

Behind capacity-building border support lies a two-decade-old, well-documented institutional and bilateral system. The Frontex channel is dominant, but not exclusive: direct member-state-to-member-state capacity-building rests on the same legal basis and is equally financeable.

For the implementation of the Pact, the question is not whether Hungary is capable of this, but whether it can succeed in fitting this existing activity into the framework of the solidarity mechanism in a way the Commission finds acceptable.