The 2026 Ankara NATO Summit and the Middle East
Although not NATO members, five Arab countries — Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates — were invited to the meeting. Four ICI Gulf states took part in the partner track, while Syria (President Ahmed al-Sharaa) was received as Erdoğan’s invited guest on the sidelines of the summit, where he also met with Trump — not as a formal partner delegation. Syria was thus brought in at Turkey’s insistence, which clearly confirms Turkey’s role in Syrian affairs and, at the same time, Syria’s return to the American sphere of influence. The United States expects Syria to help stabilize Lebanon and weaken Iranian influence exercised through Hezbollah. Washington is also working on normalizing Syrian-Israeli relations. At the meeting, NATO also gave a clear sign that it supports the four Gulf countries involved in the war with Iran (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates). These countries suffered the greatest damage in the war, having been targets of Iranian missiles and drones, while also being key to the security of the West’s energy supply.[1]
NATO’s growing role in the Middle East can be explained by the war with Iran, which broke out on February 28, 2026, under American-Israeli leadership. In the first weeks of the war, President Trump accused NATO allies of failing to provide sufficient logistical support to American forces in the war, particularly regarding the provision of airfields for American fighter jets and control of the Strait of Hormuz.[2] Since then, NATO member states and the secretariat have made statements suggesting that they may participate in ensuring the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict has entered an intermittent, grinding phase, following the clear agreements (MOU) of April 8, and then of June 14, both of which collapsed in July after Iran attacked ships bypassing its designated route, and the United States reinstated the naval blockade. Traffic through the strait has practically frozen, and negotiations through Oman have stalled. The French-British-led maritime mission, supported by some twenty countries — including several NATO member states — stands ready, but its full deployment depends on a lasting ceasefire. The security of the Strait of Hormuz is a card that Iran’s leadership will keep playing for a very long time in a protracted war. This is why the United States wants to focus on airstrikes and nuclear negotiations with Iran, while drawing NATO into controlling the Strait of Hormuz.[3]
The Middle East was the subject of the section on the broader security environment in the Ankara summit’s closing declaration. The declaration states: “The Alliance continues to respond and adapt to strategic competition, broad instability, hybrid threats, and repeated shocks that define our broader security environment. Allies reiterate that Iran must never possess a nuclear weapon, and call on Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”[4] This declaration clearly signals an intent to support the American approach toward Iran, which aims to eliminate Iran’s nuclear military capabilities and remove the Iranian threat in the Strait of Hormuz. A few days after NATO backed the American position in Ankara, the United States resumed intensive airstrikes against Iran.[5] Although the United States does not need NATO for airstrikes, NATO’s participation in securing the Strait of Hormuz would provide significant help.
NATO’s Capabilities for Stabilizing the Middle East
NATO took a strategic step toward Middle Eastern security engagement when, at its 2004 Istanbul summit, it established the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The initiative brought Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates into organized security cooperation in counterterrorism, training and education, giving them the opportunity to participate in NATO exercises, as well as promoting military interoperability, disaster response and civil emergency planning, tailored advice on defense reform and civil-military relations, and cooperation opportunities in border security to prevent human, drug, and arms trafficking.[6]
In addition, NATO opened a liaison office in Amman in September 2025. Jordan has long assisted the United States’ military and strategic presence, and has cooperated with NATO for more than three decades.[7] Although the failure of the Iraq War called American Middle East strategy into question, the 2023 outbreak of the Gaza war and the presence of Iranian-backed militias in the region highlighted the United States’ role in stabilizing the region. Jordan is expected to contribute to the administration of Gaza and may play a role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, since it has maintained its peace treaty with Israel over recent decades.[8]
At the 2026 Ankara meeting, NATO member states discussed a joint mission with Arab Gulf states to secure the Strait of Hormuz. France and the United Kingdom outlined a plan to create a coalition of about a dozen countries, led by France and Britain and supported by NATO member states but formally outside NATO, for a multinational maritime expedition in the Strait of Hormuz. Several NATO member states have already stationed minesweepers, warships, and support vessels in the region, particularly in the Gulf of Oman, a waterway connecting the Arabian Sea to the Strait of Hormuz, bordered by Iran, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Paris and London intend to launch their first mission in the Gulf of Oman in order to avoid direct confrontation with Iran. Whether this mission proceeds further toward the Strait of Hormuz will depend on the extent of NATO’s involvement, Iran’s reaction, and American strategy. Currently, France is the only country willing to take on an initiating and more active role in supporting the United States in the region.[9]
NATO in the Mediterranean
In 1994, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue, a cooperation platform aimed at promoting good relations and mutual understanding between Mediterranean countries and NATO allies, thereby fostering security and stability in the broader Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean Dialogue currently includes the following non-NATO countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. This dialogue is regularly strengthened through military and political cooperation and training. Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco also take part in NATO military activities.[10] Nevertheless, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya did not succeed; it led to the removal of Gaddafi but sparked serious controversy, as it increased instability.[11] At the 2024 Washington NATO summit, NATO expressed a clear commitment to strengthening its engagement and cooperation in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel, and adopted an action plan for a more robust, more strategic, and more results-oriented approach.[12]
Among the Mediterranean region’s most important non-NATO allies, Morocco represents a unique example of a country simultaneously providing a strategic presence in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel. In 2004, Morocco was granted “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA) status by the United States.[13] Morocco’s counterterrorism experience, together with its Atlantic coastal location — which provides access to West Africa and the Sahel — aligns with NATO’s strategic vision. Among the countries on the Mediterranean’s southern shore, it has strengthened its military-level cooperation with NATO more than any other, contributing to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). In 2020, Morocco hosted a NATO-supported regional military exercise (REGEX 2020).[14]
NATO and New Challenges
Focusing on the strategic risks arising from the 2026 conflicts, the conflict between Israel and Turkey over Syria — during which Israel attacked Turkish forces and a military base in Abu al-Dhuhur — could have a direct impact on NATO, since Israel is a significant non-allied country and Turkey is a member of the organization.[15]
With the signing of the Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on August 7, 2026, a new strategic risk arises for NATO. Turkey is a NATO member, while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are important non-member allies of NATO. Saudi Arabia only recently, during Trump’s second term, received MNNA status, while Pakistan has held this status since 2004. All three countries are concerned about United States Middle East policy, as well as Iranian and Israeli military actions.[16] If any of the three countries becomes embroiled in a conflict with Iran or Israel, NATO would find itself caught between conflicting strategic objectives. It should also not be overlooked that Turkey has the second-largest military force in NATO after the United States.
The same applies to the tension between Morocco and Spain over Ceuta and migration, even though a military clash between the two countries is unlikely, given the significant economic interests binding them together. We have already discussed the Iran war, which further radicalized the Revolutionary Guard, which is now trying to negotiate its survival and buy time by sabotaging maritime energy supply channels in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Economic terrorism is thus becoming a problem that NATO will soon have to confront. A further challenge is posed by Iran’s threats to attack Europe. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is capable of deploying drones and ballistic missiles against Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria as well.[17]
Perspectives
Israel would welcome a more active NATO role in the Middle East. There are disagreements between Turkey and Israel over Syria, Turkey’s influence over Hamas, Turkish-Qatari support for Islamism in the Middle East, and the Turkish-Pakistani-Saudi alliance aimed at saving the Iranian regime in exchange for a peace agreement. NATO is well suited to managing the Turkish-Israeli crisis, since it is an umbrella organization representing American strategy, in which both Israel and Turkey have their own roles. Israel has for years advocated that NATO play a formal role in the Middle East, and that Israel itself be allowed to join the alliance (Israel has been one of NATO’s most important non-member allies since 1987).[18]
Similar efforts are underway to reduce Iran’s ability to pose a threat to the Middle East, the global economy, and vital energy flows. Although these processes require time, Turkey, Israel, and numerous Arab countries consider NATO’s role in the Middle East to be decisive.
If NATO actively participates in protecting energy supplies from the Middle East, the global economy will stabilize, and the flow of energy to Europe will be secured. The 2026 Iran war showed that economic security is essential for Europe, and a coordinated system to protect oil and gas tankers traveling from Persian Gulf countries to Europe can prevent the continent from becoming vulnerable to Middle Eastern political unrest, conflicts, and instability. The European economy also depends on shipping European goods to Gulf markets, and if shipping routes are not secure, this significantly affects Europe’s competitiveness with China. Unlike most European vessels, Chinese ships have so far been able to transport energy and goods to and from the Gulf (as well as the Red Sea) freely. Strategically, Europeans are aware that this situation is unsustainable, and that they must take a more active role in securing maritime trade routes.[19]
Summary
The 2026 NATO summit held in Ankara confirmed NATO’s growing interest in the Middle East. France and the United Kingdom, in particular, are leading efforts to protect the Strait of Hormuz and secure the energy supply from the Persian Gulf to the West. NATO’s presence in the Middle East could help ease tensions between Turkey and Israel, while providing protection for Gulf countries and supporting the security of the global economy. At the same time, NATO — alongside its member states and key allies — faces serious security risks, such as the Turkey-Israel conflict over Syria, the Morocco-Spain incident concerning Ceuta and migration, and the atrocities arising from the maritime routes securing energy supplies from Iran.
NATO in the Middle East:
The July 2026 Ankara NATO summit is a milestone: for the first time, the alliance has clearly expressed its intent to participate in stabilizing the Middle East. This analysis reviews the decisions made in Ankara, NATO’s Middle Eastern toolkit, and the open risks.
Context: The Iran war (February 28, 2026 – ongoing) and the threat of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have fundamentally changed NATO’s Middle East calculus. What was a strategic option in 2024 became an operational necessity by 2026.
The Ankara NATO Summit and the Middle East:
Invited non-member countries:
- Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE — ICI members, took part in the partner track
- Syria (President Ahmed al-Sharaa) — as Erdoğan’s personal guest, not as a partner delegation
- Syria’s participation confirms Turkey’s influence, and at the same time Damascus’s return to the American sphere of interest
The summit’s key messages on the Middle East:
- 22 EU member states, in a joint letter: “Iran must never possess a nuclear weapon”
- A call for Iran to respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz
- Implicit NATO support for US airstrikes on Iran — which resumed a few days after the summit
- French-British coalition plan: ~20 countries, Gulf of Oman, outside the NATO framework — but with NATO member participation
Why not a formal NATO mission?
France and the United Kingdom deliberately placed the maritime mission outside the NATO framework — to avoid the automatic applicability of Article 5 and direct Iran-NATO confrontation.
NATO’s Middle Eastern Toolkit:
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) — since 2004:
- Members: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE
- Areas: counterterrorism, military training, interoperability, border security
- Limit: a political-security partnership — not a defense guarantee
Mediterranean Dialogue — since 1994:
- Members: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia
- Regular military-political cooperation and training
- Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco have also taken part in actual NATO operations (KFOR, IFOR, SFOR)
Other capabilities:
- NATO liaison office in Amman — since September 2025
- Jordan: a NATO partner for nearly 30 years, with an expected role in administering Gaza and in the Israeli-Palestinian settlement
- Morocco: MNNA status since 2004, unique presence in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel
The Libyan lesson (2011): NATO’s intervention in Libya led to the removal of Gaddafi but increased instability. This precedent still counsels caution regarding direct military intervention today.
Current Challenges for NATO:
The Mecca Agreement (August 7, 2026):
- Signatories: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan — all three either MNNA or NATO members
- Shared concern: US Middle East policy, Iranian and Israeli military actions
- Turkey is NATO’s 2nd-largest military force — building a parallel defense structure is unprecedented
- If any party becomes embroiled in a conflict with Iran or Israel: NATO gets caught between conflicting objectives
Iranian Threat Against European Targets:
- The IRGC is capable of deploying drones and ballistic missiles against Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria
- Blockading the Strait of Hormuz and sabotaging Red Sea energy channels: economic terrorism
- These threats already directly affect NATO territories
Strategic Perspectives:
What does NATO gain from Middle East engagement?
- Energy security: protecting Gulf-Europe maritime routes reduces the EU’s competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis China
- Managing Turkish-Israeli tensions: NATO, as an umbrella organization, is suited to a mediating role
- Reduced US burden: sharing logistical and maritime tasks with allies
Limits and risks:
- The maritime mission can only be deployed at full strength after a lasting ceasefire
- The Mecca Agreement reinforces Turkey’s dual loyalty
- Libyan and Iraqi precedents: military intervention does not guarantee stabilization
Summary:
What did the 2026 Ankara NATO summit decide about the Middle East?
It reaffirmed the allied position on the Iranian nuclear threat and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. A French-British initiative is shaping a maritime mission in the Gulf of Oman.
Why is NATO interested in protecting the Strait of Hormuz?
A decisive share of Europe’s energy supply passes through this route. If Chinese ships can transport freely while Europeans cannot, this directly harms Europe’s competitiveness.
What is the Mecca Agreement, and why is it a risk for NATO?
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement on August 7, 2026. As a NATO member, Turkey is building a parallel defense structure, which can create conflicting loyalties.
Is there a direct Iranian threat against NATO member states?
Yes. The IRGC is capable of reaching Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria with drones and ballistic missiles. Sabotage of maritime energy channels also affects the economic interests of NATO member states.
Could Israel join NATO?
Israel has been one of the US’s most important non-member allies since 1987, and has advocated for formal NATO membership or role for years. Because of Turkish-Israeli tensions, this is not politically feasible for now.
[1] Musharakat al-duwal al-khalijiyya fi qimmat al-Natu: Dawafi’ al-taqarub wa-afaq al-sharaka al-amniyya
raseef22.net/article/1102099-مشاركة-الدول-الخليجية-في-قمة-الناتو-بأنقرة-دوافع-التقارب-وآفاق-الشراكة-الأمنية
[2] US allies balk at Trump’s appeal to help secure Strait of Hormuz
https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/16/europe/us-allies-trump-help-strait-hormuz-intl
[3] NATO allies to discuss Hormuz tensions, mission with Gulf Arabs
[4] The Ankara Summit Declaration
[5] Iran hits tankers after third night of US attacks; Trump reimposes naval blockade
[6] Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/istanbul-cooperation-initiative
[7] NATO opens Liaison Office in Amman
https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/09/16/nato-opens-liaison-office-in-amman
[8] Jordan’s NATO Problem
https://en.al-akhbar.com/news/jordan-s-nato-problem
[9] NATO allies to discuss Hormuz tensions, mission with Gulf Arabs
[10] Mediterranean Dialogue
[11] NATO’s Intervention in Libya: Assessment and Implications
https://www.iemed.org/publication/natos-intervention-in-libya-assessment-and-implications/
[12] Mediterranean Dialogue
[13] Ez amerikai jogi minősítés (az USA törvénykönyve, 22 U.S.C. §2321k), nem a NATO státusza: kiemelt védelmi és haditechnikai együttműködéssel jár, de nem tartalmazza a NATO kollektív védelmi garanciáját (Washingtoni Szerződés 5. cikke).
[14] Mediterranean Dialogue
[15] Israel attacked Turkish forces and a military base in Abu al-Dhuhur
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-906261
[16] Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan pledge mutual defence as Middle East turmoil escalates
[17] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/21/iran-southeastern-europe-threats
[18] In upgrade to ties, NATO accepts Israel’s official representative
https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-upgrade-to-ties-nato-accepts-israels-official-representative/
[19] Not Europe’s War? The Gulf Crisis and the EU’s Maritime Dilemma
https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c05/not-europes-war-gulf-crisis-and-eus-maritime-dilemma