Africa’s Eldorado: The Background of the Mali War

The Opposing Sides and Their Backers

The main rebel group at present consists of jihadists from the al-Qaeda-linked “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims” (GSIM, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin), which leads most of the attacks against the Malian army. GSIM fighters unite various African salafist jihadist organizations linked to al-Qaeda’s worldwide terrorist network, and their goal is to introduce Islamic law across all of North and West Africa. The Tuareg (3.5 percent) and Fulani (13.3 percent) ethnic groups living in northern Mali form the core of GSIM’s leadership and fighters. However, GSIM also has leaders and members from Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, which is consistent with the organization’s goal of destabilizing the Sahel and, where possible or where the forces behind it require it, sowing disorder in North Africa as well.[1]

The second group, the Azawad Liberation Front, is a Tuareg (3.5 percent of the total population) separatist military organization in northern Mali, in the Azawad region. Its goal is to create a state inhabited by the Tuareg in the northern and central parts of Mali. This would cover more than 60 percent of the country’s territory. Thus, the jihadists and the Tuareg share the same enemy — the central government in Bamako — but have different goals. The jihadists have a broader, not concretely defined but rather strategic objective aimed at dismantling Mali and the states of the Sahel, while the Tuareg are seeking independence. Nevertheless, the demographic factor that defines both movements is the Tuareg minority. Since Mali’s independence in 1960, there have been four major Tuareg uprisings against the central government: those of 1962-64, 1990-95, 2007-09, and 2012. These groups rely on foreign countries — mainly France, Algeria, and Mauritania — which have interests in the region, for weapons and financial resources.[2]

The Malian army, on the other hand, has its strongholds in the south, where the majority of the population lives, and is supported by ethnic groups such as the Bambara (33 percent) and the Dogon (8.7 percent). Since 2021, the Malian army has been supported by Russia through the Wagner Group and Africa Corps. Despite this support, since the jihadists killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara on April 25, 2026, the Malian army has been losing the war. Initially, between 2012 and 2020, France (and the West) supported the government, and since 2021 Russia has done so. The state army is able to keep urban areas under its control, and can push the rebels north toward the Algerian and Mauritanian border with airstrikes, but as soon as the situation stabilizes, attacks resume and spread quickly across the desert over hundreds of kilometers, in a country whose territory is 1,240,192 km², twice the size of Ukraine (603,628 km²). The rebels have a territorial advantage, and it is estimated that the modestly sized state forces (40,000 troops) cannot control this huge territory, even though they outnumber the rebels (estimated at around 10,000). Since early September 2025, GSIM jihadists have imposed an economic blockade that is having a strangling effect on Bamako. In December 2025, the junta in the capital came under unprecedented pressure from GSIM. They attacked fuel-tanker convoys, advanced from various directions, intensified attacks on the routes leading into the city, and placed the western territories under blockade.[3]

Gold, Lithium, and Uranium: Mali’s Natural Resource Reserves at the Center of International Competition

Mali has enormous gold, lithium, and uranium reserves, among the largest in Africa and the world. The value of lithium and uranium has risen because of global demand for electric vehicles and batteries, as well as for nuclear energy and weapons. This makes Mali a target of international competition for resources. Official estimates suggest the country may have as much as 2,000 tons of geological gold reserves. Most of the gold mines exploited so far are located in the western Kayes region, as well as in the southern Sikasso and Koulikoro regions. More than two million people depend on gold mining for their livelihood. With an estimated 100 tons of gold production in 2024, Mali is Africa’s second-largest producer after Ghana (140.6 tons), and slightly ahead of South Africa (98.9 tons). Some of the production is official (about 57 tons), while the rest is under-administered and sold through extensive smuggling.[4] According to data from the US Department of Commerce and the International Monetary Fund, gold is by far Mali’s most important export. It accounts for about 80 percent of all exports and generated approximately $4.3 billion in revenue in 2024.[5]

Mali is estimated to have 5.8 billion tons of lithium deposits. The Goulamina project, located in the southern part of the country, holds one of Africa’s largest lithium deposits, with reserves estimated at more than 200 million tons. China’s Ganfeng Lithium holds the majority stake, Australia’s Leo Lithium also holds a significant stake, while the Malian state holds a smaller percentage. Mali is also estimated to have 11,000 tons of uranium. Uranium exploration has concentrated on the northern Kidal and Falea regions. However, because of the conflict in the north, most of Mali’s uranium reserves remain unexplored.[6] All of these resources attract international actors and fuel separatist ethnic aspirations.

State Structure, and Ethnic and Economic Divides

As in many Middle Eastern and African states, the plan to build a nation-state based on a centralized national identity has failed in Mali as well. Rather than integrating the diversity of its ethnic groups, it focused on a single ethnic group, the Bambara, who make up only a third of the population, even though the country consists of twelve other ethnic groups spread across a large geographic area. In addition, Mali is divided into two distinct regions: the north (Sahara), a desert home to the nomadic Fulani (13.3 percent) and Tuareg (3.5 percent) peoples, and the south (Savanna), home to the Bambara and the location of the capital, Bamako. Unless they are as prosperous as their neighbors, pastoral groups often raid neighboring communities with better living conditions in order to seize their assets.

Historically, present-day Mali was for centuries part of Saharan empires created by tribal alliances that secured the flow of gold and other goods, making it Africa’s richest country. The French arrived in the 19th century, drawn by gold, and seized control of the region through devastating colonial wars. After gaining independence from France in 1960, Mali embraced socialism, and, alongside a few military coups and transformations, the system survived until 1991. Socialism suppressed the diversity of the country’s ethnic, economic, and cultural identities, while failing to unite them without the use of military force, and, despite its gold reserves, failed to secure prosperity for the population. Since the 1990s, the country has once again come under French influence. Nevertheless, France failed to save the Malian state from collapse, as shown by the 2013 Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane (2014-2022). Mali’s example illustrates well the shortcomings of state-building and the challenging process of creating a nation-state out of the remnants of multi-ethnic empires.[7]

Mali’s example also illustrates well how wealth can be squandered if ethnic and religious diversity is not managed properly. Foreign powers such as France and Russia, as well as regional actors such as Algeria and Libya, treat Mali as a playground. The ethnic groups living in the north of the country offer them an opportunity to exploit and seize a share of the country’s resources, regardless of what governmental structure emerges as a result of the war.[8]

If a state is weak and excludes certain ethnic groups, and is dependent on foreign aid, religious fault lines become inevitable. This explains why Islamist militias are the most convenient tool for foreign powers, since they can be deployed against the central government. Mali’s jihadist militias show recent, new foreign influence from Algeria and Libya. They insist on the enforcement of sharia law and the destruction of nation-states, and on fulfilling their role — or disappearing from the scene, only to reappear in another form — according to the agenda of the forces behind them. Nevertheless, the jihadists are willing to take part in the geopolitical game and become mercenaries of foreign powers in exchange for weapons and money. Currently, since 2020, they have been fighting against the pro-Russian government, whereas initially, for nearly a decade (2012-2020), they fought against the then pro-French, pro-Western government.[9]

Mali and the European Union

Despite the war, the EU maintains a presence in the country through the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Under this framework, assistance has been provided to 335,000 Malian refugees in neighboring countries, 180,000 refugees in Mali, and 414,000 people who have been temporarily displaced from their homes, as well as 1.6 million people in urgent need of food aid. Since 2012, the EU has provided €568 million in humanitarian aid to Mali.[10] For the 2021-2024 period, the EU earmarked €151 million in support, under two main priorities: growth and the green economy, and improving human development and the situation of young people. In the 2025-2027 period, Mali will receive additional funding aimed at improving access to basic social services, strengthening economic and social resilience, promoting civic participation, preventing violent extremism, and adapting to climate change.[11]

The EU’s primary aim in Mali is migration prevention. As a result of the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the northern and central regions, continuous and sustained migration flows have started from Mali toward North Africa and Europe. The EU has mobilized the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to create economic opportunities in the Kayes, Sikasso, and Koulikoro regions, and is supporting the protection and return of migrants by setting up various assistance centers and supporting the sustainable reintegration of migrants.[12] This European policy could alleviate the root causes of emigration from Mali by rescuing part of the population from poverty and providing certain basic services. However, the Malian crisis is structural in nature, and it is up to the government to create the stability essential for development.[13]

Summary

Like many other African countries, Mali is a battleground for regional and international competition over resources. The failure of nation-building and state-building leads to ethnic uprisings, particularly among the Tuareg, and provides fertile ground for jihadist organizations seeking to destabilize the country. The war has been going on since 2012, and the Malian government — whether pro-Russian or pro-French — is currently losing against the intransigent rebels in the north (jihadists and Tuareg separatists). Under difficult circumstances, the EU is providing significant assistance to prevent a humanitarian and refugee crisis.

Root Causes, Actors, and European Dimensions of the Mali War 

Mali’s war, ongoing since 2012 — in which the Bamako government faces jihadist and Tuareg separatist militias — reached a critical turning point in the spring of 2026. With the rebels’ April 25 offensive, the northern region fell entirely out of government control. This analysis identifies the root causes of the 14-year conflict, the interests of the opposing sides, and the EU’s role in stabilizing Mali.

The Opposing Sides and Their Backers

Rebels: an alliance of two different aims
GSIM — Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (al-Qaeda network)

• The leading jihadist force, linked to al-Qaeda
• Core made up of Tuareg (3.5 percent) and Fulani (13.3 percent) fighters
• Members and leaders also come from Libya, Algeria, and Morocco
• Goal: introduce sharia law across all of North and West Africa
• Strategic goal: destabilize the Sahel states

Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) — Tuareg separatists

• A Tuareg military organization active in northern Mali (Azawad region)
• Goal: an independent Tuareg state over more than 60 percent of Mali’s territory
• Four major uprisings since 1960 (1962-64, 1990-95, 2007-09, 2012)
• Shares a common enemy with GSIM — the Bamako government — but with different ultimate goals

Key observation: The jihadists and the Tuareg separatists are tactical allies, but their goals are fundamentally different: the former are interested in dismantling the state, the latter in independence.

The Malian Army and its Backers

• Southern strongholds, with ethnic support from the Bambara (33 percent) and Dogon (8.7 percent); about 40,000 troops, versus ~10,000 rebels
• Since 2021: the Russian Wagner Group → Africa Corps; 2012-2020: French and Western support (Operations Serval and Barkhane)
• Strategic disadvantage: a country of 1,240,192 km² — twice the size of Ukraine; April 25, 2026: the death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara — a turning point

Since September 2025: GSIM has imposed an economic blockade on Bamako: attacks on fuel-tanker convoys, blocking the capital’s supply routes, mounting pressure

Gold, Lithium, Uranium — the Role of Natural Resources

Mali’s enormous raw-material reserves are one of the most important structural drivers of the conflict: they attract foreign actors and fuel separatist ambitions.

State Structure and the Structural Causes of the Conflict

Failure of nation-state building:

• Mali consists of ~14 ethnic groups, but the state has concentrated on a single one, the Bambara (33 percent)
• A deep cultural and economic divide between the north (Sahara) and south (Savanna)
• Nomadic Tuareg and Fulani groups vs. settled southern communities — persistent tension
• Since 1960: socialism → military coups → French influence → collapse

The logic of foreign actors:

• France, Russia, Algeria, and Libya all treat Mali as a “playground”
• Islamist militias are the most effective external tool against the government
• Jihadists are willing to act as mercenaries: in exchange for weapons and money
• 2012-2020: against the pro-Western, pro-French government
• 2020-2026: against the pro-Russian junta

Structural paradox: The jihadist militias’ political-ideological goal (sharia, dismantling the state) and their mercenary role (geopolitical proxy) exist side by side. This duality makes them difficult to manage.

Mali and the European Union

Humanitarian presence:

• Assistance to 335,000 Malian refugees in neighboring countries
• 180,000 internal refugees, 414,000 people displaced from their homes
• Urgent food aid for 1.6 million people
• Since 2012: €568 million in humanitarian aid

Development financing:

• 2021-2024: €151 million — green economy, human development, youth
• 2025-2027: basic social services, resilience, prevention of extremism

The EU’s primary interest: reducing migration pressure:

• Creating economic opportunities in the Kayes, Sikasso, and Koulikoro regions
• Assistance centers, sustainable reintegration
• EU policy may ease the root causes of emigration — but does not resolve structural problems

EU limitation: The Malian crisis is structural in nature — primary responsibility lies with the government. The EU’s humanitarian and development tools alone are not sufficient to create stability.

Possible Scenarios

Scenario 1 — Negotiated settlement (most likely):

Characteristics: regional peace talks with Algerian mediation; partial recognition of Tuareg autonomy; isolation of GSIM’s extremist wing

Consequence: partial territorial loss — but Bamako survives; the jihadist threat does not disappear; EU development funds may help stabilize the southern region

Scenario 2 — Collapse of the junta / disintegration of the Malian state:

Characteristics: GSIM reaches Bamako; the army disintegrates or stages a coup; Russia withdraws its support

Consequence: humanitarian catastrophe; mass migration wave toward Europe; regional destabilization (Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso)

Scenario 3 — Protracted frozen conflict:

Characteristics: the north is de facto lost, but there is no formal secession; the economic blockade eases from time to time; foreign forces remain present

Consequence: chronic humanitarian crisis; smuggling and drug and arms trafficking intensify; the EU treats the symptoms, not the disease