The importance and mobilisation of voters with an immigrant background in France

First, we will outline some key points regarding the significance of Muslim votes in French politics, as well as in the broader context of European politics. Next, we will examine the background of Muslim immigration to France. Following this, we will discuss the voting trends of voters with Muslim backgrounds up to 2024. Finally, we will draw some conclusions for the future.

The significance of Muslim votes

French Muslim votes are important for European politics from several perspectives. First, France, along with Germany, is one of the two most economically and politically significant countries in the European Union. Second, global and international factors in world politics uniquely impact the Muslim vote. For example, the Gaza conflict played a significant role in the support of the radical left by Muslims in both the European and parliamentary elections held in France in June and July 2024. Muslim voters are also influenced by the countries of origin, which often provide electoral guidelines and preferred candidate lists to their diaspora. French Muslim votes, as demonstrated by the recent French parliamentary elections, can be crucial. As we have seen, the left-wing alliance caused a huge surprise by winning the July elections despite the anticipated success of the National Rally, a victory made possible by Muslim votes. Should the National Rally or the radical left win in France, there would undoubtedly be strategic changes in the country’s foreign policy approach, which would have a significant impact on European politics. Moreover, the Muslim vote is a community vote, meaning that members of Muslim communities cast their votes based on guidelines provided by their leaders, selecting candidates who are believed to represent favourable political positions for Muslims. This is a sign of the failure of integration, as the mobilisation of large Muslim communities is only achievable through Islamist movements or the embassies of their countries of origin; both of which are foreign political actors with their agendas. This fundamentally hinders the political assimilation of immigrants, who, regardless of external influences and community guidance, should vote for the party that best aligns with their interests, just like other citizens.

The Muslim vote is significant because the long-standing failures of left-wing and liberal policies, particularly in the economic sector, have accumulated to such an extent that they have plunged France into a deep crisis. Thus, the Muslim vote extends the left’s dominance and delays change in France.

A historical overview of Muslim immigration in France

Three waves of Muslim immigration to France can be distinguished:

•  Migration from the colonies (both before gaining independence and as a result of the independence struggles),
• Labor migration,
• Mass migration, which includes family reunification, illegal migration, and those arriving with student visas.

Despite its significance, the colonial migration that occurred during the first half of the 20^th century is often ignored by many observers. These immigrants were viewed as subjugated individuals, denied the right to citizenship, relegated to the periphery of society, and found employment opportunities only in the military or physical labour. They harboured deep-rooted and lasting hostility toward France. During World War I, 300,000 men from the colonies, primarily from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), were drafted, and 30,000 of them lost their lives on the front lines. Meanwhile, 130,000 North African workers took the place of the French in the factories who had gone to fight.[1] During this period, a group of conscripted Algerians (known as Harki) later fought on the French side against the National Liberation Front during the Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962. Some of them settled in France. Including their descendants, their number is estimated at around 600,000 today.[2] Initially, they lived under very difficult conditions, being placed in camps and denied access to most services.[3] This illustrates how France’s history and that of immigrants became intertwined in the 20^th century, and how the feelings of immigrants today are still shaped by the fact that they were almost exclusively employed as soldiers or labourers.

The second wave of Muslim immigration occurred in the 1950s and 1960s due to the massive labour demand in French industry. However, in the mid-1970s, France restricted the arrival of new immigrants and instead supported family reunification, hoping for consolidation and demographic replenishment.[4] This generation was reserved and focused on work and money. They did not participate in French political and social life and practiced Islam only in private and during holidays.[5]

As guest workers began bringing their families to France in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the third wave of Muslim immigration – the largest and most controversial in France – began with family reunification. Following the economic crisis of the 1980s, thousands of North African students arrived, as job opportunities in their countries of origin had significantly decreased. This phase lasted until the most recent wave of mass illegal migration and asylum seekers arrived in France (as well as in other European countries), following the 2008 global economic crisis and the Arab Spring. In the third phase, family reunification and students were the main sources of legal migration to France.

While North African, and to a lesser extent West African and Turkish populations dominated the first and second waves of migration, today’s illegal migrants and asylum seekers come from a variety of predominantly Muslim countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Syria, and several African nations.[6] Starting from the 1980s, the second generation of Muslims born in France was much more active than their parents: they learned French well, became politically and socially active, founded Muslim associations, and joined trade unions and political parties associated with the French left.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a considerable number of refugees and students arriving from various Middle Eastern and North African countries were activists in Islamist organizations. These leaders were typically Salafists (fundamentalist Sunni Muslims) or members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They established the networks and financial resources that provided support and orientation for the second generation of immigrants. The emergence of Islamist terrorism in 1994 significantly complicated the lives of Muslims in France as well. Since the mid-1990s, security measures have been implemented to control both the ideological manifestations of Islam and the Muslim communities in France.[7]

Various segments of the French state and society are distrustful of the transformation within Muslim communities, which is also reflected in the ongoing conflicts related to the enforcement of the external symbols of secularism (such as issues surrounding women’s attire).

Being Muslim, however, does not necessarily mean that the individual is religiously observant. Only 26 percent of Muslims claim to regularly practice Islam, while nearly 44 percent identify as atheists or non-practicing Muslims.[8] In France, the identity of Muslims is more closely tied to their country of origin (such as Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, etc.), their social stratum (mostly unskilled and residing in so-called sensitive areas), and their ethnic background (Sub-Saharan African, North African, or Middle Eastern, i.e., “black,” “brown,” or “white” French). These aspects are linked to the ideologized, so-called postcolonial identity, which emphasizes the suffering of their ancestors during the colonial period and connects it to their own marginalized social status. This ideology continues to inspire numerous movements today.[9]  However, the diversity of identities and behaviours, along with the continuous increase in the number of immigrants, instills fear among the majority of French people.

The evolution of the preferences of voters with a migration background

Like in other European countries, Muslims have historically voted for the left, as the first waves of immigrants were guest workers who were heavily influenced by trade unions, and long-time supporters of left-wing political parties. Despite this, the sociological and demographic changes among French-born Muslims with an immigrant background have split the Muslim votes between the radical left and the liberal left. However, the rise of the right in France, led by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), is pushing Muslim votes into a single camp.[10]

Research on Muslim voters in France over the 20 years from 2002 to 2022 shows an initial loyalty to the Socialist Party, followed by a shift away from the party in favour of other left-liberal parties. In the 2002 presidential election, 69-79 percent of Muslims voted for the left (for the Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin, who lost to Jacques Chirac). In the 2007 presidential election, 95 percent of Muslim voters supported the Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal against Nicolas Sarkozy, whom Sarkozy defeated.[11] Between 2004 and 2007, some surveys indicated that the proportion of Muslims in France was between 2.6 percent and 5 percent.[12] In 2008, 4.1 million people in mainland France (about 6.3 percent of the total population) identified as Muslim, regardless of how religious they considered themselves. Of these Muslims, 70 percent were of North African origin, 10 percent were of Sub-Saharan African origin, 9 percent were of Turkish origin, and 11 percent were either converts, had no immigrant background, or were of other origin.[13] In the 2012 presidential election, 86 percent of Muslims supported François Hollande against Nicolas Sarkozy, with Hollande ultimately winning the election. However, after high abstention rates, Muslim votes shifted to left-liberal candidate Emmanuel Macron over the right, which marked the end of the Socialist Party’s solid Muslim voter base. As a result, in the 2017 presidential election, 92 percent of Muslims voted for Emmanuel Macron, who won against Marine Le Pen.[14] According to Pew estimates, in 2016 5.7 million Muslims were living in France, marking an increase of 1.6 million over eight years (since 2008).[15] In the first round of the 2022 presidential election, the radical left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France Insoumise, LFI) received 69 percent of the Muslim votes. In the second round of the 2022 election, 85 percent of Muslims who voted supported Macron against Le Pen.[16] According to a report by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee), in 2023, 10 percent of the population (7 million people) identified as Muslim, solidifying Islam’s role as the second most important religion.[17]

Based on these trends, several important conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in the most recent three elections – 2012, 2017, and 2022 – the Muslim votes have proven to be decisive. Secondly, the rise of the liberal left (Macronism) and the radical left (LFI) may explain why the Socialist Party lost the support of Muslim voters. Thirdly, Muslim votes have been a barrier to the advance of the right, particularly the National Rally led by Marine Le Pen.

The 2024 European Parliament elections

In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the war in Gaza played a significant role among Muslim voters in France, thereby increasing the electoral prospects of the pro-Palestinian movement led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s LFI.[18] By placing the Palestinian cause at the centre of their campaign, La France Insoumise attempted to win over the Muslim residents of French suburbs, although this was only partially successful.[19] With 9.89 percent of the votes, this party secured nine seats in the European Parliament. (It finished in fourth place, well behind Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, which secured 31.4 percent of the votes.).[20] Since the Palestinian issue is only partially related to the daily lives of Muslims in France, it was not sufficient to mobilise Muslim voters.

According to an IFOP survey conducted for the newspaper La Croix, 62 percent of Muslim voters who participated in the European Parliament elections on June 9 supported the radical left-wing party La France Insoumise. Despite this, 59 percent of Muslims abstained from voting, which was worse than the national average. This indicates that neither the potential advance of the right nor the efforts of other left-wing parties were able to effectively mobilise Muslim voters. Eighty-three percent of LFI voters cited the Gaza war as their reason. Overall, 74 percent of Muslim voters supported the left.[21]

The results of the 2024 French parliamentary elections

The results of the 2024 French parliamentary elections surprised many observers: the expected winner, the National Rally, finished in third place behind the left-wing alliance and Macron’s party, the Ensemble (although there were doubts about the National Rally securing an absolute majority). The left-wing’s electoral cooperation with the Ensemble to prevent a National Rally victory, along with fearmongering, mobilised the immigrant community. Their votes were crucial for the left’s triumph and explain the right’s defeat.

The NFP (the left-wing alliance) led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon won the election with 180 seats. Macron’s centre-left left-wing party, the Ensemble, came in second with 168 seats, while the National Rally finished third with 143 seats. The victory of the left and the Ensemble was contributed by the electoral cooperation that the left and the Ensemble brokered in the second round to support the candidate who had the best chance of defeating the National Rally candidate in each district. Previously, in the presidential election, this strategy successfully prevented the advance of the National Rally, and now it has proven effective in the parliamentary elections as well. Macron finished in second place, which means he does not have to resign from office – a realistic possibility after his defeat in the European Parliament elections on 9 June – but he cannot govern without the support of the left. At the same time, the NFP won the election but does not have the absolute majority needed to form a government.

Alongside their cooperation against the National Rally, Macron’s party and the left maximized fearmongering.[22] Before 7 July 2024, the French media portrayed the National Rally as a threat to Europe, democracy, and immigrants. The only factor that hindered Macron and the left’s victory was the typically high voter apathy among immigrants. Nevertheless, there was a strong national voter turnout of 66.63 percent (the highest since 1997)[23] partly due to significant mobilization within the Muslim community against the rise and divisive rhetoric of the National Rally.[24] During the campaign period from 1 to 7 July, the National Rally was portrayed as a symbol of racism and fascism, while Macron and the left were depicted as the ones preventing the rise of fascists.[25]

One reason why the Muslim/immigrant votes influenced the National Rally’s defeat is that Le Pen’s party planned to abolish the 1968 agreements regulating immigration and the movement of people between Algeria and France. This was perceived as an existential threat by the French population with ties to Algeria or of Algerian descent. More than one million Algerian and French dual citizens live in France, who have been alienated by the National Rally. This group overwhelmingly supported the left’s efforts to defeat the right. Groups of immigrants from other countries (West Africa, North Africa, and Turkey) had similar fears. From this, we can infer that the fears of immigrant-background voters were a decisive factor that contributed to the left’s victory.[26]

In the 2024 European Parliament elections, 93 percent of rural voters in France supported the right-wing. In the parliamentary elections, the support was approximately at the same level, according to estimates. However, the National Rally was unable to gain traction in urban areas because immigrant communities have considerable influence in metropolitan regions. As a result, the Leftist Alliance received 7.4 million votes and 180 seats, while the National Rally secured 10 million votes but only 143 seats. This discrepancy arises because urban areas carry more weight in electoral districts compared to rural areas.[27]

Lessons for the future

Muslim votes are highly significant and generally support left-wing parties. During the 2024 parliamentary election campaign, the left conducted a vigorous campaign within immigrant communities, taking advantage of the demographic changes in the French population of urban areas. These left-wing parties assured immigrants that they would protect them from the rise of the right, that they could influence their fate through the election of representatives, and that their concerns would be taken seriously.[28] In France, the demographic shift was irreversible, and immigrant votes favoured the left in both the most recent parliamentary elections and the presidential elections held since 2012.

The ten percent (the current proportion of Muslims in France) is likely to be crucial in any future electoral contests within the fragmented political environment.

It seems that five lessons can be drawn from the voting preferences of French Muslims, particularly concerning the 2024 elections and those to follow. The first lesson is demographic in nature: over time, immigrants are gradually replacing the indigenous French population, as stated in “The Great Replacement” theory by Renaud Camus[29]. According to this theory, non-white immigrants have been deliberately settled in France by globalist groups to replace the white French population. The number of Muslims has doubled over the past 20 years, and by 2050, the current migration rate and birth rate within Muslim communities are likely to result in a further doubling of the Muslim population. The Muslim votes will therefore be significant in the upcoming elections. The electoral influence of the Muslim minority appears to be irreversible in France, particularly in urban districts.

The second lesson is the so-called “Islamo-leftism.” This has been evident so far, as the left has formed an alliance with Muslim voters to gain their support against the “far-right,” offering the continuation of social welfare programs in return. As a result, the left may win future elections by exploiting the social vulnerability of immigrants and positioning itself as their protector. The consequence of this relationship is a permissive attitude towards certain Islamist movements, as well as its impact on French foreign policy in the Middle East and Africa.

The third lesson is that fragmentation weakens the state. The French political system, which was once dominated by the right-wing Republicans and the left-wing Socialist Party, is no longer bipolar but has now fragmented into three main blocs and a dozen smaller parties. Due to the lack of a political force capable of dominating the elections, the power of French governments has significantly diminished as a result of this fragmentation. It seems unlikely that a patriotic party like the National Rally will be able to win and govern France on its own, as Muslim voters will almost certainly continue to support the left. A coalition of the far-right and the Republican right, which could achieve a relative majority to defeat Macron and the left, might be the only realistic alternative.

Muslim votes are motivated not only by fear of deportation but also by religious and international political conflicts (such as the Palestinian issue and Islamism), as well as economic and social factors (poverty, marginalization, and discrimination). The National Rally could appeal to Muslims with a social and economic program, as this was one of the main factors behind the party’s relative success in 2024. The left typically raises public debt to finance social benefits for the population, which can exacerbate France’s economic difficulties and delay necessary reforms. A strong economic program from the National Rally could make a breakthrough.

The fifth lesson is the formation of a divided and weakened society along religious and ethnic lines, with the risk of this being further heightened by the left’s victory, bolstered by Muslim votes. This could exacerbate radicalization among far-right supporters, who may believe that French democracy has been usurped. Since many Muslims continue to live in poverty and commit crimes, the left, which is unable to address France’s economic problems, will likely be inclined to make further concessions to immigrant communities in areas such as foreign policy and the display of religious symbols. This could create an environment that fosters Islamist radicalization. It has been proven that left-wing clientelism leads to economic collapse. Similarly, the left is likely to support migration to secure its political future, as immigrant communities and the left enjoy mutual benefits.