The 2024 Magdeburg car attack: terrorist profile, background and system failures

The 2024 Magdeburg car attack, in which a terrorist drove a vehicle into the crowd at the Magdeburg Christmas market on 20 December 2024, killing five people and injuring at least 235 others, reignited the debate on the links between migration and terrorism. The profile of the terrorist and the circumstances of the attack divided politicians and analysts. For one thing, the character of the perpetrator is different from the previous ones, as he is a Saudi psychiatrist of Shiite background, who claims to be an atheist and has Islamophobic views. This shows that terrorism is not just a tool of hardline Islamists. For another thing, the upcoming federal elections in February 2025 are key to understanding the timing and consequences of the attack. In this analysis, we first present the German political context of the attack and then the profile of the terrorist.

Political background in Germany

The primary background for the attack is the preparation for the federal elections in Germany. Due to the break-up of the coalition government during the German government crisis of 2024, elections will be held on 23 February 2025. The AfD and CDU/CSU are the main contenders, which means that Olaf Scholz’s SPD and Robert Habeck’s Greens are expected to suffer heavy defeats. According to most opinion polls, the CDU/CSU will win with around 30%, followed by the AfD with 20%. In recent weeks, however, support for the AfD has increased, while that for the CDU/CSU has remained stable.^[1] This can only hurt the coalition parties (especially the SPD and the Greens). The rejection rate^[2] of Alice Weidel (-2.6), co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), is higher than that of O. Scholz (-1) and F. Merz (-0.6), but her joint virtual events with Elon Musk in the campaign are generating a lot of attention for her. Given the daily news about the poor state of the German economy, the AfD’s popularity could even increase further by 23 February 2025.^[3]

The SPD and the Greens could benefit from the attack by arguing that the terrorist is sympathetic to the AfD, which incites violence with its extremist views. But the AfD, with its strong campaign against migration, can also benefit from the migrant status of the perpetrator. The widespread outrage caused by the attack will help the AfD to win votes even if it does not finish in first place. Chancellor Olaf Scholz came under heavy pressure after he said a few days before the attack that the German economy was dependent on Syrian migrants.^[4] The main concern for Germans is the state of the economy, and this is likely to benefit the CDU/CSU. At the same time, voters would punish Scholz’s coalition for its poor performance in recent years. The CDU/CSU had an open immigration policy under Merkel, supported by the SPD and the Greens. As the AfD’s communication and statements in the media on the 2024 attack have intensified the debate on illegal migration and security, the party’s lead over the SPD and Greens is expected to continue to grow. There is also renewed debate on what to do about immigration from Syria.^[5]

However, the AfD, which is in political quarantine, will not become a coalition partner, and the CDU/CSU is seen as a more moderate opposition than the AfD. The former could only use the Magdeburg attack to win over anti-immigration activists, but the middle class, interested in reviving the economy, has more confidence in the CDU/CSU because of their experience in government. Ultimately, the consequences of the attack will not help the AfD to become the strongest party, regardless of the original intention of the attacker. There are two possible scenarios: in the first case, the attackers wanted to undermine the credibility of the AfD. In the second case, they tried to put the CDU/CSU in a position where its migration policy would continue to be compatible with the SPD and the Greens and not with the AfD. If the latter was the goal, the result would be a weakened German government, divided by internal divisions, which would primarily serve the geopolitical interests of the United States.

The perpetrator

The attacker, 50-year-old Saudi national Talib ʽAbd al-Muhsin, is much older than previous young first- or second-generation immigrant perpetrators. Muhsin is a Saudi citizen of Shiite background. According to Saudi sources, he came from Al-Hofuf, which is located in the east of the country. He was born in a kingdom that prioritises its Sunni identity and where Shiites in the eastern provinces are marginalised. He left Saudi Arabia in 2006 to seek asylum in Germany, claiming he was persecuted for his atheism.

The best known figure in Saudi atheism is Abdullah al-Qasemi (1907-1996). Initially, he worked as an Islamic scholar and followed the teachings of the Wahhabism (the official religious denomination of the Saudi state). However, his thinking gradually changed in the 1930s and he eventually became one of the best-known critics of Islam. He moved to Egypt, where he wrote several books critically examining Islamic dogma and Arab societies. In Saudi Arabia, atheism is officially considered a criminal offence, and the 2014 Anti-Terrorism Law included atheism among terrorist activities. Public atheist organisations or clubs are not allowed. However, over the past decade, the internet and social media have made it possible for non-religious Saudis to contact each other anonymously. There are online forums and communities in Arabic where religious issues are discussed. These platforms are often hosted on servers abroad. In cities, especially in the younger and more educated classes, informal meetings can occur, usually very discreetly, often under the guise of a friendly get-together. Atheist activities are actively monitored by the authorities, and getting caught can have serious consequences. It is estimated that only 5-9% of the population is atheist,^[6] but religious freedom is not allowed in either the private or public sector. This is causing tension, especially among young people. Many live a “double life”: outwardly, they observe strict religious observances, but within their circles there are a variety of worldviews: some lean towards a more liberal interpretation of Islam, others turn away from religion altogether, some sympathise with Western secular values, while others seek new spiritual paths. The rise of social media and the internet has made it easier for these young people to connect with like-minded people, although they are still not allowed to openly express their views.

ʽAbd al-Muhsin has shown signs of mental instability in Germany and has previously threatened terrorism. After his degree was initially refused naturalisation, in 2013 he said he would carry out an attack similar to the one at the Boston Marathon. The police investigated, but decided there was no threat. Later, in 2014, he threatened a judge and a local government official. He was generally considered a disturbed individual who sometimes threatened suicide or terrorist attacks.^[7] The Saudis warned the German authorities three times that he was dangerous and had fled the country because of his involvement in terrorist activities. Apart from publicly expressing his sympathy for the AfD, he strongly criticised the German authorities for not committing themselves to the fight against Islam and not accepting Saudi atheists as political refugees. He also used drugs before and during the attack. However, Germany granted him asylum, a residence permit and the possibility to continue his psychiatric practice (he started working at the Federal Penitentiary in Bernburg in 2020). In 2023, a Saudi woman also alerted the German authorities to ʽAbd al-Muhsin’s plans for a car attack.^[8]

System errors

Radical violence links the perpetrator to former terrorists. One of the weaknesses of the system is the lack of a workable definition of extremism and an appropriate criminal procedure. ʽAbd al-Muhsin advocated an extreme approach to the criticism of other religions, political ideologies and government policies. As extremism makes one susceptible to political instrumentalisation, sponsorship of terrorism and manipulation by foreign intelligence services, it is critical to screen out those who hold extremist views or exhibit such behaviour. The fact that German officials ignored all warning signs that ʽAbd al-Muhsin was a threat shows that the German political system’s ability to provide protection has weakened. This is particularly dangerous in a country that has received one million migrants.

Another weakness of the system is the positive assessment of asylum seekers with a criminal record. ʽAbd al-Muhsin’s background in Germany and Saudi Arabia should have been a cause for concern about the granting of asylum. This means that asylum should not be granted to those who hold extremist views and have a criminal record without a thorough investigation. Without any checks, the German authorities took his statements at face value, which allowed the misuse of the reception system.

The third mistake was to ignore the fact that Germany was at high risk of terrorism in December 2024. There is a risk of terrorist attacks, for which the government had not introduced preventive measures. Prior to this attack, Germany had already been the target of two terrorist attacks in 2024: the May stabbing in Mannheim and the August stabbing in Solingen. In 2024, Germany was the only EU country to suffer terrorist attacks. This foreshadowed a significant risk of terrorist attack over the Christmas period. The upcoming elections are another divisive factor in German society.

Summary

The weaknesses of Germany’s migration policy are the misuse of the asylum process by migrants, the lack of control mechanisms by the German authorities for applicants at the borders and the low number of deported rejected or delinquent asylum seekers. Thus, the process of granting asylum should be tightened up, in which any radical ideology is a ground for exclusion. The economic crisis in Germany is likely to increase extremist views, which may sometimes manifest themselves in violent acts. Warnings about extremism respect social freedoms, although they may sometimes restrict the rights of some individuals. The latest terrorist attack proves once again that an open migration policy is unsustainable; although the majority of migrants are peaceful, there is no reliable protocol for filtering out dangerous elements and this threatens social stability.