Evaluation of the European Commission’s 2025 Asylum and Migration Report

Responsibility

In terms of responsibility, the report emphasises the need to develop more efficient, faster, stricter and fairer procedures for processing asylum applications, reducing the administrative burden on Member States and providing adequate assistance to migrants. It proposes the application of new admission rules, an updated Eurodac database, and the use of a screening mechanism at the EU’s external borders. These tools help identify the Member States responsible for processing applications for international protection.[1] However, the report does not mention a single achievement or step forward in this area over the past year, but merely instructed Member States to comply and improved the standards set out in the new pact on migration and asylum.

In reality, however, each country feels isolated and needs to mobilise its own resources to best manage illegal migration flows. Italy, for example, deviated from the norm when it agreed to deport illegal migrants to Albania.[2] It also made financial and political agreements with Libya and Tunisia to help deal with illegal migration.[3] Illegal migrants arriving on Italian shores are placed in camps and centres, perform agricultural work, or eke out a living in cities. Some of them continue to Germany or France, but Poland, Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece also struggle with illegal migration on a daily basis.

Return

Between July 2024 and June 2025, Member States issued a total of 478,000 deportation decisions against illegal migrants, representing an 11% increase compared to the period between July 2023 and June 2024. However, in practice, only 115,000 illegal migrants were sent back to their home countries. This means that only 24% of deportation decisions were enforced, which indicates a significant failure of the system. This failure not only encourages illegal migrants to come to Europe (since even if they are sentenced to deportation, they still have a 76% chance of remaining in the EU illegally), but also reduces the effectiveness of other mechanisms, such as responsibility and solidarity. If deportation orders cannot be enforced, it makes no sense for a country to share the burden of new arrivals. The European Commission recognises this shortcoming and recommends more effective cooperation with third countries and support for current initiatives to establish a common EU system for returns. In reality, however, enforcement is only possible if governments take the necessary steps to repatriate illegal migrants. As a result, the European Commission acts as a de facto federal government, passing laws and issuing orders while expecting local governments to take responsibility for repatriating migrants.[4]

Most of those asked to leave were Afghan, Syrian, Algerian, Moroccan, and Turkish nationals.[5] Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey are safe and economically developing countries in every respect. Turkey is a member of NATO, a candidate for membership of the European Union, and signed an agreement with the EU (the 2016 agreement) on managing migration. Morocco is a pro-Western country that signed agreements with Spain and France on sending back migrants in exchange for economic aid. Turkey and Morocco cooperate with the EU and European governments on various security and economic levels. In the case of Algeria, although Franco-Algerian relations are currently not ideal, the European Commission and European governments can continue to exert pressure on Algeria to take back its citizens. In Syria, the new government is seeking to revitalise the country’s economy and is prepared to take back its citizens, although the economy remains in crisis. Nevertheless, Friedrich Merz stated that “Syrians no longer have any reason to seek refuge in Germany, and deportations could begin in the near future”.[6]

Afghanistan is somewhat different from the other four countries, as the Taliban are a fundamentalist militia. However, Europe does not have to recognise the Taliban government or approve of its policies on civil liberties. The EU cannot decide on the internal affairs of other countries, nor can it attempt to change them by exerting pressure (such attempts have never been effective anyway). Furthermore, illegal Afghan migrants pose a high risk in terms of crime and security, which has prompted 19 EU countries and Norway to demand measures for the voluntary or forced repatriation of Afghans.[7] In the interests of European citizens’ security, Europe may continue to cooperate with the Taliban, who are willing to accept Afghans deported from Europe, and negotiations on this have been held with Germany.[8] This is all the more possible given that more than 4 million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan over the past two years, and more than 1.5 million are expected to return in 2025.[9]

Solidarity

The report also includes the European Commission’s proposal to establish a solidarity fund to support Member States facing pressure from migration. The European Council is likely to approve this proposal and decide on the size of the solidarity fund and the extent to which each Member State will pay in, in line with their fair share. Once the Council adopts the decision on the solidarity fund, the solidarity contributions of the Member States will be made public and become legally binding. However, Member States may continue to choose the type of solidarity contribution they wish to provide, including financial support, alternative measures, relocation or responsibility sharing, or a combination thereof.[10] This is not a new element compared to the pact on migration and asylum.

However, based on the need for solidarity, the criteria used to classify countries are biased and forced. Greece, Cyprus, Spain, and Italy are included in the list of countries eligible for solidarity funding due to migration pressure. The EU’s migration facility is available to Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and Finland as countries vulnerable to migration pressure. Due to their serious migration situation, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Austria, and Poland may ask the Council to withhold all or part of their contributions to the Solidarity Fund for the following year. Thus, 18 of the 27 EU Member States are under migration pressure and need solidarity, including France and Germany. The countries that are not under pressure and must show solidarity are as follows: Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, Slovakia, and Romania. The selection criteria are inconsistent, and there is clear bias against Hungary. How is it that Croatia and Bulgaria are under migration pressure, while Slovenia, Romania, and Hungary are not?

Hungary

The European Commission did not mention Hungary at all in its brief press release, even though Hungary has proposed measures to combat migration since 2015.[11]  A sajtóközlemény azonban megemlíti Lengyelországot, amely Magyarország álláspontját osztja a kérdésben. Érdekes megjegyezni, hogy a jelentés 18 országot sorol fel migrációs nyomás alatt álló, vagy migrációs nyomásnak kitett országként, de nem említi Magyarországot, amely a balkáni útvonal bejáratánál fekszik.

However, the press release mentions Poland, which shares Hungary’s position on the issue. It is interesting to note that the report lists 18 countries as being under migration pressure or exposed to migration pressure, but does not mention Hungary, which lies at the entrance to the Balkan route.

The European Commission mentions Hungary only once in the report itself, and six times in the endnotes. It mainly points out that Hungary, like the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania, has provided housing assistance to many persons enjoying temporary protection.[12] The report also highlights Hungary in terms of strategies for handling asylum applications submitted at the borders, noting that, like Croatia, Luxembourg, and Romania, Hungary has not yet shared its strategy with the European Commission.[13] Like Poland, Hungary is also one of the countries that have not accepted the national emergency plans for admission and asylum of the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA).[14] Hungary’s position on migration is not unique, as it is not the only country that has concerns about the EU’s migration management methods or intentions.

The exclusion of Hungary and the Balkan route from the areas affected by migration pressure casts serious doubt on the credibility of the report. According to Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), the Balkan route was a major entry point for illegal migrants in 2024, with 21,520 arrivals, while Spain (the Western Mediterranean route) recorded only 17,026 arrivals in 2024.[15] How is it possible that Hungary is not under migration pressure, while Spain is, even though there were fewer illegal entries into Spain? We should add that Spain benefits from illegal immigrants because they are employed in agriculture and construction.[16]

Furthermore, compared to the Balkan route, there were only 17,001 illegal entries at the eastern land border (Poland and Lithuania) in 2024, yet Poland and Lithuania are mentioned as countries under migration pressure, even though they are not. Hungary also made a significant contribution to reducing the number of illegal arrivals via the Balkan route, which fell from 144,197 in 2022 to 21,520 in 2024.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Greece, Cyprus, Spain, and Italy are all members of the “coalition of the willing” aimed at providing financial and military support to Ukraine in its war with Russia. As members of this coalition, Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Finland are considered countries exposed to migration pressure, even more so than Hungary, which is not a member of the coalition but is pushing for peace talks, despite its significant role in the migrant issue. Therefore, participation in the conflict in Ukraine determines who is a “good” and who is a “bad” European, as well as whether or not the country is under migration pressure. As a result, financial support is allocated on the basis of these flawed criteria, which undermines the debate on migration within the EU.

Conclusion

The long-awaited Annual Report on Asylum and Migration in Europe 2025 finally reiterates the principles mentioned in the new pact on migration and asylum, namely the responsibility for selecting migrants at the external borders, solidarity with countries under migration pressure, and a repatriation policy aimed at returning migrants whose applications have been rejected. However, little or no progress has been made over the past year. Moreover, the war in Ukraine seems to be creating bias: countries supporting the war are treated as in need of solidarity, while Hungary is ignored.