Sweden is known as one of the most open societies and political systems in the European Union, largely determined by the hegemony of the left in recent decades. Thanks to the leading role played by the Social Democratic Party, immigration became a central element of Swedish political discourse: governments regularly made humanitarian commitments that often went beyond basic refugee protection standards. Initially, migration was considered a rational decision from both an economic and demographic perspective, as the aging society and labour market demand justified the admission of immigrants. As a result, left-wing governments developed a system that attempted to coordinate labour and refugee migration in parallel and made institutional changes to this end, such as the creation of the Integration Office.
However, the 1990s were a turning point: as a result of the Yugoslav Wars, hundreds of thousands of refugees, mainly from Bosnia and Kosovo, arrived in the country, which was an unprecedented wave of migration. These groups settled not for work, but for humanitarian reasons, thus replacing the previous economically-driven migration with a socially-driven process that poses greater integration challenges. This reinforced Sweden’s image as a welcoming country, but it also placed an increasing burden on the welfare state, as the integration of refugees required extensive integration programmes and significant budgetary expenditure. Therefore, legal reforms have been introduced since the 2000s, including the establishment of migration courts and the expansion of the role of local governments in the care of minor refugees. The figures clearly show the increasing burden: while 22,000 people received settlement permits through family reunification in 2005, this figure rose to 48,000 in 2017.
In other words, under left-wing dominance, Sweden’s immigration policy has developed into a system that aims to serve both humanitarian and economic goals. However, the openness that was consciously embraced at the outset generated social and institutional burdens as a result of the mass influx of refugees, which in the long term shaped the country’s international image and made migration a central issue in domestic political debates.
The shocks of mass migration
The Swedish government has tried to address changing migration patterns with a number of measures over the past decades, but their impact has proven to be increasingly limited. The shortcomings of the inclusion-based system (unemployment, crime, language barriers, parallel societies, and the housing crisis) became particularly apparent during the 2015 European migration crisis. At that time, Sweden accepted the highest number of asylum seekers per capita, more than 162,000 people, which, in addition to the already significant 20% foreign-born population, further exacerbated integration difficulties and overburdened the welfare system. The more than 350,000 asylum applications submitted between 2013 and 2017, as well as the growing number of cases related to family reunification, also placed a huge burden on public administration.
The social consequences of these problems are also reflected in statistical data. According to a 2016 Pew Research survey, security concerns have increased across Europe, and fear of terrorism has also grown in Sweden, especially after the 2017 Stockholm terrorist attack. At the same time, the number of armed crimes rose: while in 2012 there were 17 homicides involving firearms, by 2022 this number had risen to 63. The indicator related to drug trafficking and sexual crimes also deteriorated. Political correctness has long restrained official communication, but the trends have become clear.
Inequalities also emerged from an economic perspective. Households headed by foreign-born individuals already received significantly more social benefits than native Swedish households in 2013, and the difference nearly doubled by 2018. On top of this, in 2017, the unemployment rate among foreign-born residents was 14.7%, compared to just 3.7% among Swedes. State welfare spending grew disproportionately, while social inclusion weakened.
These processes contributed to a gradual shift to the right in Swedish public opinion, calling into question the previously dominant pro-immigration and left-wing political establishment. Experience since 2015 has made it clear that policies based on the idea of an open society have been unable to cope with the security, economic, and social challenges posed by mass migration.
Torn status quo
When examining the transformation of the Swedish political landscape through the lens of migration, three aspects stand out: have anti-establishment parties managed to break out of their communication quarantine; are the major traditional parties losing votes; and can this be substantiated by opinion poll data? The results of the three parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2018 clearly show the direction of change. In 2010, the Sweden Democrats (SD) exceeded all expectations by crossing the parliamentary threshold with a result of 5.7%, thereby gaining 20 seats. The party deliberately placed the issue of migration, which has been considered taboo for decades, at the center of its campaign. By 2014, the SD had doubled its share of the vote (12.9%), becoming the third strongest party in parliament, and then in 2018 it grew even stronger with 17.5%, finally breaking through the communication isolation maintained by the mainstream.
At the same time, support for the major parties declined: Between 2014 and 2018, the Social Democratic Party lost more than 100,000 voters and the Moderate Party lost nearly 170,000, while the SD gained more than 330,000 new supporters. This trend was also confirmed by opinion polls. According to Eurobarometer, in 2009 only 9% of Swedes considered migration to be the country’s biggest challenge, but by 2015 this figure had risen to 53%. An Ipsos MORI survey showed that between 2013 and 2017, the proportion of people who believe there are too many immigrants in Sweden rose from 33% to 50%.
Based on all this, it can be said that the change in social attitudes toward migration directly contributed to the destabilisation of the Swedish political status quo. The steady decline in support for the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party, coupled with the rise of the SD, foreshadowed the emergence of a new political force based on a shift away from the “open doors” policy and criticism of immigration.
Rightward shift
The autumn 2022 elections in Sweden were historic, heralding the rise of the Sweden Democrats (SD). The party achieved nearly 21% in the September elections, becoming the second largest political force in the country and increasing its number of supporters by 200,000. The traditional left-wing bloc, led by the Social Democratic Party, was unable to form a government due to coalition constraints, so the right-wing parties (the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberals) realised that governing would only be possible with the involvement of the SD. This recognition was reinforced by informal political contacts, such as the discussions between Ulf Kristersson, leader of the Moderate Party and prime ministerial candidate after the election, and Jimmie Akesson, president of the SD.
The rapid rise of the SD over four election cycles transformed it from a previously marginalised party into the second strongest political force, creating political gravity that led to the formation of a hybrid coalition between the right-wing bloc and the SD in order to secure a parliamentary majority. The first step in this direction was the Tidö Agreement signed after the elections, which focused on migration management and cooperation in other areas. The agreement aimed at radical changes in the Swedish immigration system: making refugee status temporary, differentiating applications by region, limiting assistance, making immigration procedures accountable, introducing requirements-based integration, and immediately addressing the challenges of parallel societies.
As expected, the Tidö Agreement provoked widespread criticism both domestically, especially among civil society organisations, and in European political circles that support immigration. At the same time, Sweden’s tendency toward stricter policies is not unique; Denmark, for example, introduced similar and in many respects even more radical restrictions in response to the 2015-2016 migration crisis, prioritising rapid return to the country of origin over integration.
Overall, the 2022 Swedish elections and the Tidö Agreement marked the beginning of a new political era based on the recognition that illegal immigration is incompatible with the country’s normative development. As a result, migration policy underwent a radical transformation, the role of the Sweden Democrats became unquestionably dominant, and the balance of power between the left and right wings in the country was radically redrawn.
