Migration balance in Sweden in light of facts and figures

In 2024, approximately 64.6% of Sweden’s population was ethnically Swedish, while the remaining 35.4% were predominantly immigrants and their descendants from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.[1] The most common countries of origin: Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Iran, and Afghanistan. According to EUROSTAT data, the number of foreign-born people was 2,169,296 in December 2024,[2] meaning that around 20% of the country’s 10.5 million population was born abroad. Sweden primarily attracted asylum seekers, so there was no wave of workforce immigration. Although the 1950s saw a small influx of temporary workers from southern Europe and Turkey, the first significant wave of non-European immigrants who came as asylum seekers arrived in Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s.

Today, after Argentina and the United States, Sweden is home to the third largest Chilean community, with a diaspora of around 45,000 people who fled the government of Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 1990. During the Iran–Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, nearly 7,000 Iraqi and 27,000 Iranian refugees were granted settlement permits in Sweden. In the 1990s, the Yugoslav Wars led to significant immigration from the former Yugoslavia, with more than 100,000 Bosnians and 3,600 Kosovar Albanians being granted asylum. Then the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered another wave of immigration, while word spread that Swedes were friendly toward asylum seekers. In 2015, more than 160,000 people sought asylum, mainly from Syria, although there were also many Afghans and Iraqis. Those who have been granted asylum in Sweden have initiated family reunification procedures, which significantly increases the proportion of immigrants from the Middle East, especially Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Despite tighter immigration policies in Sweden in recent years, a significant number of Syrians continued to arrive between 2014 and 2022. Since 2022, the largest wave of immigration has come from Ukraine, with approximately 47,000 people.[3]

Sweden’s open immigration policy has put a serious strain on the country’s economy, so in 2023, the Swedish government decided to significantly restrict the number of asylum seekers, reducing the number of applications to around 9,000. In addition, it launched a programme to bring in skilled workers after failing to attract a significant number of foreign skilled workers. Stricter conditions have also been introduced with regard to family reunification and the acquisition of Swedish citizenship. Measures have been taken to simplify the student visa system and create opportunities for foreign researchers and PhD students.[4] These efforts have slowed down humanitarian immigration. However, the restrictive measures came too late, given the significant demographic size of immigrants. As elsewhere, migrants usually explore loopholes in new regulations that allow for exceptional treatment. The flow continues through visa applications for work, family reunification, or asylum.

The failure of integration: urban riots and no-go zones

The Swedish welfare state was overwhelmed by the economic crisis and the influx of asylum seekers, which had serious consequences, such as urban riots and the emergence of no-go zones. The frequency and extent of riots is one of the best indicators of social disintegration. Sweden had one of the highest numbers of these between 2008 and 2023. In fifteen years, ten urban riots took place, including the following incidents: the 2008 Malmö mosque riots, the 2009 anti-Israel riots in Malmö, the 2010 and 2017 riots in Rinkeby, the May and December 2013 riots in Stockholm, the nationwide riots of 2016, 2020, and 2022, and the riots of 2023 over the burning of the Quran.[5] These escalated from local violence (starting in the suburbs of Malmö and Stockholm) to nationwide urban riots. This suggests that immigration policy is facing significant problems and that immigrants’ resentment towards Swedish society has grown stronger.

One of the main causes of urban riots is the crisis of the Swedish welfare model. The economy has been in decline for decades due to the 2008 financial crisis, the ongoing European economic crisis due to loss of competitiveness, the global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. Immigrants have high expectations, as they have come to take advantage of the benefits offered by the welfare state.[6] In reality, however, they live in a country that is no longer able to maintain the welfare system that was created under radically different circumstances after World War II. Migrants are also facing growing resentment from society due to the crimes they have committed, and expectations that they should work, contribute to the economy and integrate.[7]

According to official data, Sweden has as many as 59 “no-go zones”, so-called vulnerable areas where the police are unable to perform their duties or where the native population can hardly pass through without being harassed or attacked. Of these, there are currently 27 “vulnerable areas,” 15 “risk areas,” and 17 “particularly vulnerable areas.” While in 2017, 200,000 people, or 2% of the population, lived in particularly vulnerable areas, by 2023 this figure will rise to around 550,000, or 5% of the country’s population.[8] The police estimate that there are approximately 5,000 criminals and 200 criminal networks operating in these regions.[9] From 25 April 2024, the Swedish police will have the right to establish “security zones” where they can search people and vehicles even if there is no suspicion of a crime. A security zone classification remains valid for two weeks but may be extended if necessary.[10]

These areas are known for gang wars, high rates of assault, theft and murder, which law enforcement agencies are unable or unwilling to control. As gang violence escalates, Sweden has one of the highest rates of organised crime-related killings in Europe. Statistics show one shooting a day on average, and 53 people were shot or killed in 2023. Despite efforts by the Swedish police and government, there has been no significant progress in reducing violence in these areas.[11] In 2017, less than half of 15-year-olds in particularly vulnerable areas of Gothenburg achieved sufficient marks to enter secondary education. In the Bergsjön district of the city, 69.8% of 15-year-olds left primary education without having achieved the level of numeracy and literacy required to start secondary education, compared with a national average of 17.5%.[12]

Due to failures and tensions, the state is increasingly unable to maintain control over these areas, immigrants feel abandoned, religious fanaticism and gang culture are becoming more entrenched, and more and more young people are being drawn to gangs or Islamist groups.[13] After Albania, Sweden ranks second in terms of gang violence: more people have been killed here than in any other European country, and it also has the highest per capita rate of firearm-related deaths in Europe.[14]

The future of the Swedish model

In September 2024, the Swedish government announced that from 2026, the current allowance of approximately $978 per adult would be increased to more than $34,000 (350,000 Swedish kronor) for those who voluntarily return to their country of origin.[15] This came after only 70 voluntary repatriation requests were submitted in 2023.[16] A 2022 survey found that 79% of asylum seekers had visited their country of origin for holiday purposes.[17]

With Ukrainian and Syrian refugees, the cost of migration has become enormous for Sweden.[18] Furthermore, the Swedish government needs to increase its budget for integration initiatives in order to prevent further social problems.[19]The 2025 budget allocated 513 million Swedish kroner for migration-related expenditure. The government estimates that this amount will be 2,559 million in 2026.[20] The government aims to create a total of 1,000 detention places as quickly as possible in order to enforce deportation orders more effectively.[21] A total of 86,400 people left Sweden in 2024, an increase of 18% compared to 2023.[22]

In 2015, Sweden accepted 163,000 asylum seekers and spent €6 billion (1.35% of GDP) on migrants.[23] The Swedish Pension Institute estimates that immigrants are expected to generate an additional SEK 70 billion for the pension fund due to the increased number of employees, while additional social security expenditure increases costs by SEK 150 billion.[24] OECD statistics show that in 2014, Sweden had the largest gap between the employment rates of native-born and foreign-born residents among 28 countries.[25] The unemployment rate among low-skilled, non-European immigrants was around 31.7% in 2005, rising to 36.9% by 2016.[26]

In view of the negative results, the Swedish government is joining Italy’s project to transfer immigrants to Albania, but the deportation process and the implementation of stricter migration policies also entail significant costs.[27] The police require a larger budget to combat organised crime[28], and additional funding is also needed to process asylum applications.[29] The cost of migration and integration is a burden that adds to the current economic crisis and Sweden’s significant investment in financing the war in Ukraine.[30]

According to forecasts, long-term immigration to Sweden will remain above 100,000 arrivals per year.[31] With a population of 10.5 million and an additional 1 million immigrants over the next ten years, the proportion of immigrants in Sweden would rise to 30% by 2035. The Swedish Statistical Office forecasts a Swedish population of 12.6 million by 2070[32], while Eurostat predicts 11,994,364 by 2040 and 14,388,478 by 2080.[33] If nothing changes, the number of immigrants will increase by 10% every ten years, and in less than fifty years, immigrants and their descendants will be in the majority. Given that many immigrants are unskilled or low-skilled and require government social assistance, this would result in a significant demographic change that would affect Sweden’s economy, which needs a skilled workforce to remain competitive.

Conclusion

Sweden’s case presents one of the most dramatic social transformations of the 21^st century. The former “humanitarian superpower” – which for decades boasted open borders and a generous welfare system – is now forced to face the consequences of its own migration policy. The final outcome of the “Swedish experiment” provides clear lessons. The integration of large numbers of people from different cultural backgrounds—especially given the structural problems of the labour market and the emergence of parallel societies—is an extremely complex challenge that may exceed even the capacity of developed welfare states. Sweden’s turnaround in 2024—with the number of asylum seekers at an all-time low, strict repatriation programs, and the introduction of security measures—signals that even the most progressive European societies are being forced to acknowledge reality.

The question is no longer whether migration policy in Europe needs to be rethought, but whether other countries will be able to learn from the Swedish example in time.

From “no-go zones” to declining PISA results, from gang wars to rising integration costs, Sweden’s history serves as a warning:

migration policy is not just a humanitarian issue, but a matter of national security, social cohesion, and economic sustainability.