Migration crisis in the UK

The facts: 50,000 illegal immigrants in one year

According to figures published by the UK Home Office on 12 August 2025, since Labour won the general election in July 2024, 50,271 migrants have arrived in the UK from northern France, most of whom have been granted asylum. In the first half of 2025, 48% more people arrived by boat through the English Channel than in the same period last year.[1] This figure represents a 60% increase between July 2024 and July 2025, compared to the period July 2023 to July 2024. In 2020, there were only 3,867 illegal crossings, but the trend has been increasing since then. In 2022 there were 48,670 arrivals, and, after a temporary drop in December 2023, there was a sharp rise in July 2024. Between 2018 and 2024, nationals of Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, Syria and Eritrea accounted for 70% of crossings. The acceptance rate for asylum seekers arriving by small boat was 68%, which is higher than the acceptance rate for asylum seekers in general.[2]

In 2024, net migration to the United Kingdom was 431,000, with 948,000 arriving and 513,000 leaving. In 2021, there were 6 million foreign-born people living here, accounting for 9% of the total population, but this number has since increased. Dual citizens with British citizenship are not included in these statistics. According to the latest figures, there are more than 11.4 million non-UK-born people living in England and Wales, of whom 3.4 million were born in the EU and 8 million are non-EU nationals. They make up around 18% of the population of England and Wales.[3] More than 80% of people who moved to the UK between 2021 and 2024 were non-EU citizens. Since 2005, Indians have been arriving in the largest numbers, accounting for 25% of all non-EU immigration since 2021. In addition to Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Afghans also form significant migrant communities. In 2024, 10% of all immigration was for the purpose of family reunification.[4]

The causes for the new crisis

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, which ended on 24 June, and its aftermath have intensified the illegal migration of Iranians and Afghans in recent months. Since the war, more than 410,000 Afghan refugees and migrants have been forced to leave Iran, and the outflow is ongoing.[5] With more than 6 million Afghan migrants living in Iran, who are seen as an economic burden and a security threat, there is great pressure on them to return to Afghanistan. Some of them, especially young men who have the money to finance their trip to the UK, would prefer to travel to Turkey to try to enter Europe.

Among the attractive factors, the most important is the Labour Party’s poor performance in returning illegal migrants. By the end of 2024, only about 5,000 people (3% of all arrivals) had been expelled, mainly Albanian citizens. Middle Easterners and Africans, who make up the majority of illegal migrants, are almost certain not to be deported after crossing the English Channel. An additional motivation is that crossing from northern France to the United Kingdom is relatively safe—in 2024, there were 73 deaths among 37,000 arrivals, representing a fatality rate of less than 0.2%.[6] Furthermore, in the UK, illegal immigrants have a 68% chance of having their asylum application approved. All things considered, this seems like an acceptable risk for illegal migrants.

Measures to tackle the crisis

On 10 July 2025, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that a new migration agreement had been signed with France, which will come into force in the coming weeks. Under the agreement, migrants arriving illegally by small boat will be detained and sent back to France. For every migrant returned, another person who has submitted a valid application may enter the United Kingdom from France. Online applicants must indicate their intention to settle and prove that they have ties to the country. This option is only available to those who have not tried to enter illegally. The agreement must also be approved by the European Commission, as France is aligning its migration policy with EU rules.

Even if the EU accepts this deal, it will not solve the UK’s migration crisis, as the same number of immigrants would continue to enter the country, only through different channels, and France would not benefit from taking back illegal migrants either. This migration swap is an ad hoc measure by the United Kingdom and France that lacks strategy and indicates that relying on short-term solutions encourages more illegal migrants to enter and settle in European countries. Migrants returning from the United Kingdom will undoubtedly set up tent camps in northern France, as they did in the past (such as the infamous Calais Jungle[7]) and this scenario will repeat itself until France dismantles these camps.

Figures for August 2025 show that migrants continue to cross the Channel despite the new regulations and the agreement with France. Hundreds of migrants arrive by small boats every day and no restrictive measure seems to have had the desired deterrent effect.[8] Immigrants, especially Iranians and Afghans, are likely to try to take advantage of the new flow triggered by the Franco-British agreement, and, given that they typically travel through Turkey and the Balkans to enter Europe, the Hungarian border could be affected. In recent days, there have been clear signs that a new war between Israel and Iran could break out at any moment,[9] which could further increase the rate of immigration. Deteriorating economic conditions for Iranians and Afghans[10] also increase the likelihood of a new wave of illegal migration towards Europe.

Iraqis also make up a significant proportion of those crossing the Channel illegally. In 2025, 1,900 Iraqis travelled by small boat to British shores, compared to 2,600 in 2024. In mid-August 2025, the British and Iraqi governments signed an agreement, the first of its kind, allowing for the repatriation of illegal immigrants from Iraq. This measure reinforced an earlier move by Prime Minister Keir Starmer, as London and Baghdad signed a cooperation agreement worth nearly €1 million last year to deter small boat crossings to the UK and crack down on organised crime, including migrant smuggling networks. Since the Labour Party took power in July 2024, Britain has signed a number of similar agreements, for example with the governments of Vietnam and Albania.[11]

Potential impacts on the UK and Europe

The fact that an EU country (France) has signed an immigration pact with a non-EU country (the UK) shows the willingness of European countries to find local solutions to migration problems. The British-French exchange deal comes less than two years after Italian and Albanian leaders agreed in November 2023 to send illegal migrants from Italy to special camps in Albania, with Italian funding.[12] As a result, several European countries are expected to take steps to enforce their national migration policies. This trend is in line with Hungary’s strategy since 2015 to consistently support sovereign migration policies.

Figures pointing to an increase in illegal immigration to the UK are likely to further strengthen Labour’s main opponent, the Reform UK party led by Nigel Farage. The party’s stance on restricting migration has contributed significantly to its steady rise in popularity. Its support is indicated by the significant results it achieved in the May 2025 local elections in England and its chances of governing have increased.[13] According to the latest IPSOS poll, conducted in June 2025, Reform UK is currently the most popular party, with a 9 percentage point lead over Labour. 34% of those polled intend to vote Reform UK, while only 25% would support Labour and 15% would vote Conservative.[14] Overall, the Conservatives and Labour have lost half of their 2024 voter base (48% and 54% respectively). The public is dissatisfied with the current government, with the over-50s (40%), the poorer sections of society (53%) and non-graduates (42%) the worst affected by rising living costs and increased immigration, and the ones who are massively supporting Reform UK.[15] After just one year in government, Labour has one of its worst records in modern times, with 76% of people dissatisfied with the government’s actions and 73% with Keir Starmer’s leadership.  Currently, Nigel Farage is the most popular politician with 34% support, while Starmer only has 19%.[16]

Conclusion

The crisis has three key lessons. First, short-term, bilateral solutions, such as the Franco-British migration exchange, cannot address a problem on a continental scale. The “migrant swap” is merely a shift of responsibility, not a real solution, and could ultimately attract more traffickers to the region. The prospect of the re-emergence of the Calais camps shows this flawed logic.

Second, the political consequences of the crisis go far beyond migration policy. The meteoric rise of Reform UK could fundamentally transform British politics. This change is not only a sign of growing anti-immigrant sentiment, but also evidence of a profound erosion of trust in the traditional parties, particularly Labour. The 76% dissatisfaction rate is historically unprecedented after such a short period of government.

Third, the crisis at European level is exacerbating tensions between national sovereignty and the EU solidarity mechanism. The examples show that more and more countries are willing to take unilateral action, which calls into question the apparent European unity on migration issues. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the geopolitical instability in the Middle East, especially the potential Israeli-Iranian conflict, which could trigger new waves of migration.

In the coming years, the UK will face a decisive choice: either to implement comprehensive migration reform that balances humanitarian obligations with national security requirements, or to turn to a radically restrictive policy, which is likely to happen if Reform UK comes to power. This latter scenario would not only change British-European relations forever but would also set a precedent for other European countries.