The hidden cost of war: Climate damage during the Russia-Ukraine war

While not a day goes by without news of the devastating consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war, in addition to the immeasurable direct damage to human life and property, it may also be worth looking more deeply at the indirect, environmental impact of the war. Shocking footage of destroyed settlements and fighting may lead many to believe that assessing and worrying about environmental damage is a secondary concern at this stage of the war, but this is a serious mistake. For one thing, it is worth bearing in mind the potential impact current damage could have on our efforts to curb climate change, especially in the shadow of a potential escalation of the conflict. For another thing, in addition to mainstream environmental approaches, a typically Europe-specific green policy conflict is becoming increasingly apparent. While the European green policy community is pushing for increasingly drastic steps to achieve a green transition on the continent, it is also typically engaged in political activity that supports the escalation of the current conflict. However, keeping up the fight runs counter to climate protection efforts, creating a political contradiction that could undermine not only the achievement of current green goals, but also the European green political forces and, more broadly, the very concept of the green transition. [1]

In a study by the Energy and Climate Policy Division of Századvég Konjunktúrakutató, we briefly review the environmental impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in the context of greenhouse gas emissions. 

Protracted modern armed conflicts: in times of war, significant direct and indirect environmental pressures can occur

Wars and military conflicts can significantly increase both direct and indirect environmental damage. Indirect effects are typically seen in active combat zones and along battle lines. Armed conflicts can ignite forest and bush fires, while explosions can disperse a variety of substances harmful to human health or the natural environment in areas, in many cases deliberately, as in the case of the Vietnam war[2]. Indirect environmental pressures are mainly due to the increased consumption of fossil fuels in the wartime economy. Moving troops and technical equipment around and running logistics chains can push up fuel consumption. Military industrial complexes to serve military needs also take up a significant amount of energy to run, not to mention the steel needed to produce the technical equipment or other chemical raw materials. But diverting air traffic and rerouting transport routes can also push up fuel consumption significantly. Any such impact could result in significant greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, such “war-related emissions” can occur not only near the front line, but also in the whole hinterland, and even indirectly in different countries at regional and global level.[3]

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict generated a huge surplus of greenhouse gas emissions during the first 24 months of the war

As more and more experts are trying to point out, the Russia-Ukraine war is also causing significant environmental and climate damage. The latter could be a particularly worrying development, as human civilisation itself is fighting its own war on climate change. According to preliminary estimates by De Klerk and colleagues, during the first 24 months of the war (from 24 February 2022 to 23 February 2024), military activities and the destruction of related infrastructure resulted in significant excess greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, further exacerbating global climate change. Cumulative emissions over this period are estimated to be around 175 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e[4]), equivalent to the annual emissions of an advanced industrialised country.[5] To understand the true extent of the excess emissions volume, the following graph can help:

Hungary’s 2022 GHG emissions were about 44 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, compared to 125 million tonnes for the Netherlands.

The combined 2022 emissions of the two countries would not even reach the level of the additional emissions that could be attributed to the current war.

In terms of vehicles, the 175 million tonnes of additional emissions can be attributed to around 90 million internal combustion passenger car emissions.

An escalating and protracted war could have dramatic consequences: it could even undermine the progress made so far in reducing global emissions

Although excess emissions are not generating evenly, there is every reason to believe that emissions are accelerating. As the psychosis of war becomes more and more prevalent in the world, military industrial complexes will take over more and more economic capacity. A number of investments in support of arms and ammunition production have already been announced, both in the West and in the East. In addition, the scale of destruction and devastation is growing by the day. Although current studies do not allow us to determine how emissions will change, assuming that they continue to increase as hostilities intensify, the surplus of GHG emissions could reach 250 million tonnes by the end of the year. This would be equivalent to the total annual emissions of Italy or Spain.

In addition to war, forest and bush fires, and the deteriorating infrastructure are the main pollutants

Military activities and the production, maintenance and use of military equipment generate significant GHG emissions. The intensive use of fossil fuels, munitions production and the heavy infrastructure systems serving war complexes all contribute to emissions, which totalled 51.6 million tCO2e (In addition to CO2, other greenhouse gases are also released, which are usually expressed in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2 equivalents) for ease of calculation). Forest and bush fires during the conflict, as well as damage to energy infrastructure (refineries and other strategic stockpiling sites) also resulted in significant additional GHG emissions. Damage to energy infrastructure and vegetation fires caused emissions of around 40.1 million tCO2e. Moreover, the lack of electricity and natural gas or district heating forces people to heat their homes with wood, coal or, in the worst case, combustible waste in winter, which can lead to additional emissions and air quality degradation.

Internal migration and migration to other countries can also generate a significant surplus of emissions, but this is already reflected in the data of the receiving countries

Populations fleeing war-torn areas may generate additional extra GHG emissions. De Klerk and colleagues’ analysis estimated the additional emissions from internal and cross-border migration at around 3 million tonnes. It is worth noting that emissions of Ukrainian citizens who have fled to Germany or Poland, for example, are included in the relevant statistical statements of the receiving country in this case, which also depends to a large extent on the energy mix of that country.

Dramatic increase in GHG emissions from the transport sector

It is also worth mentioning the additional emissions from transport. With many railway lines and port infrastructure elements severely damaged, bulk goods that would otherwise be moved by these systems also need to be transported by road. This alone could lead to significant additional emissions. For aviation, however, the modelers identified a much more severe load that is rarely covered in other similar studies. Given that the country has no civil aviation at present, no direct emissions can be identified, but as the country’s airspace is closed to all civil airlines and many airlines avoid Russian airspace, conventional air routes can only continue to operate with much longer detours. As a result, an additional 23 million tonnes of GHGs have been indirectly released into the atmosphere during the war so far.[6]

The main air routes connecting Asia and Europe via Russia

Due to current airspace restrictions, designated conventional routes carry freight and passengers with limited capacity, significant detours and intermediate points of contact. According to ICAO data, in addition to causing significant additional GHG emissions and substantial financial losses, it complicates air transport between Europe and East and Southeast Asia.

After the war: reconstruction and rearmament with further major emissions

The repair of damage to infrastructure, industrial facilities and residential properties generated a further significant emission surplus of around 24 million tonnes. It is worth noting that current reconstruction is still rather limited, with actual and significant investments expected only after the armistice, with GHG emissions several times higher than the current level.[7] Further surplus emissions could be generated by the replacement of military equipment, both from the Russian side and from the Ukrainian and Western sides. According to the Dutch specialist portal Oryx, Russia has already lost more than 90% of its pre-war active tank fleet (2,000 tanks). Although production is continuous, losses are equally constant during the active phase of the war. Assuming that these will be replaced by T-90s, which are currently in series production, on the Russian side, some 60-80 thousand tons of steel may be needed, which alone could result in another 180-200 thousand tons of GHG[8] emissions, not to mention other combat equipment and stocks.

Meanwhile, of course, the nations of the world are also actively developing their military forces, so orders for steel mills should be plentiful in the coming years.

The distribution of GHG emissions from the war by source is shown as a percentage in the figure below.

Environmental damage to date reaches USD 32 billion

The model used by De Klerk and colleagues to monetise environmental damage was the social cost of carbon, which estimates that every 1 ton of carbon dioxide emissions causes about USD 185 of damage to the global society as a whole. Based on aggregate emissions, the estimated cost of climate damage during the war exceeds USD 32 billion, or HUF 12 thousand billion. It is worth noting that the amount is calculated “only” in terms of GHG emissions. Removing mines, replacing soil, replanting forests and vegetation can cost additional substantial sums.

Green goals and war escalation are incompatible

There is a serious self-contradiction emerging in the climate and war positions of the European green parties. While Europe is trying to achieve the so-called green transition through their increasingly intense political activities, their political declarations on the war are in favour of escalation and the continuation of the war. The Greens/EFA, the largest Green group in the EP, said in a statement at the end of November[9]:

“We have a duty to support Ukraine in its fight for freedom for as long as it takes and to continue providing them with the arms they need to defend themselves. We must also accelerate the development of green energy to end our reliance on Putin’s gas. Additionally, Member States must extend support to Ukrainian refugees, ensuring no child is left behind.”

As we have already shown, the Russia-Ukraine war has already had dramatic environmental consequences, so any political action that prolongs and widens the war could be counterproductive to green goals.

Conclusions

The climate damage caused by the Russia-Ukraine war is significant and will certainly have a long-term impact on global climate change. The scale of greenhouse gas emissions and the severity of the damage caused underline the need for remediation and mitigation actions. In order to reduce climate damage, green restoration approaches are recommended for future reconstruction works. Furthermore, stopping war and promoting an armistice are key to the effectiveness of the fight against climate change. Any prolongation or escalation of the war could have unforeseen consequences for the environment, completely undermining all past and future efforts to stop climate change. There is also a growing contradiction between the climate and war positions of the European green parties. While advocating a green transition, their war policy promotes escalation and prolongation of the conflict, which can lead to environmental destruction. This policy runs fundamentally counter to green objectives, jeopardising their credibility and feasibility.

“Prepared with the professional support of the Cooperative Doctoral Programme of the University Research Scholarship Programme of the Ministry of Culture and Innovation, funded by the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.”