The impact of events in Syria on immigrant communities in Europe

Clashes between Syrian Arabs and Kurds in Europe

On 20 January 2026, thousands of Kurds protested in various cities in Germany, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia. In Dortmund, protesters set off fireworks, damaged property in the city centre, injured seven police officers, and vandalised and broke into several Arab fast food restaurants.[1] On the same day, clashes broke out in Paris when police used tear gas to disperse thousands of Kurds protesting in Place des Invalides. Protesters threw fireworks at police officers, leading to arrests and the closure of nearby streets.[2] In the United Kingdom, around 300 protesters gathered in Manchester on 21 January to protest against the invasion of SDF-controlled areas in Syria by Turkish and Syrian government forces. They got into fights with counter-protesters, threw rockets at the police, damaged cars and shops and stabbed a man. The clashes continued the next day, and the police did not arrest anyone.[3] On 22 January 2026, Kurds organised a demonstration in front of the Antwerp Opera House in Belgium, attended by around fifty people. To show their solidarity with the Kurds in northern Syria, they raised the Kurdish national flag and PKK flags. A group of counter-protesters attacked the demonstrators with knives, injuring six people, two of whom are in critical condition.[4] Similar tensions arose in Norway, Austria and the Netherlands.

In Europe, the right to protest and express political opinions is guaranteed by constitutions. However, if protesters express political sentiments towards a foreign country and come into conflict with those who hold opposing views, then we are talking about conflict importation, which poses a threat to the internal stability of the receiving country. According to the protesters, the West has a duty to protect Syrian Kurds. Since such actions serve more to express political sentiments than to express reasonable opinions, those who are unable to control their emotions or who have hidden motives for destabilisation may resort to violence. Today, Europe is home to numerous immigrant communities from the Middle East and Africa, and if each of them gave free rein to their feelings and emotions about their homeland, Europe would become a public arena for daily clashes.

Most Kurdish protesters are young men who have been granted asylum in Europe but continue to support the PKK. Beyond clashes and protests, many of them work closely with various far-left groups (since the PKK itself is a movement promoting Marxist-Leninist ideology) to help spread their propaganda on social media. Kurdish protesters believe that the West has deceived them by asking for their help in fighting ISIS while failing to support their independence efforts. However, they had not received a clear promise on this matter previously. Attacks against Kurdish civilians during military operations further fuel tensions.

Background

Pre-war Syria, with a population of 26 million, was a very diverse country in terms of ethnicity and religion. Arabs make up about 90% of the population, while Sunni Kurds are the largest ethnic minority, estimated to be 8-10% of the population, or about 1.5-2 million people. Syria’s religious composition is as follows: 74% are Sunni Muslims, 13% are Alawites and other Shia Muslims, 10% are Christians, and 3% are Druze. These communities are scattered throughout the country, with larger populations in Damascus and Aleppo, as well as in the northern and northeastern regions, Qamishli and Hasakah. Currently, the SDF controls the Hasakah Governorate, which is 25% Kurdish and 70% Sunni Arab, with a significant Christian population. Therefore, it is technically impossible to ignore this diversity and justify the Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy.[5] Hasakah is Syria’s richest province in terms of oil, natural gas and arable land, so without this region it will not be possible to effectively rebuild the Syrian economy.[6]

Under the rule of the Assad clan (1971–2024), the Kurds did not demand autonomy or independence. Some Syrian Kurds are descendants of refugees who arrived from Turkey after World War I. The PKK was invited to Syria by Hafez al-Assad in the 1980s and used to exert pressure on Turkey. However, the fate of the Kurds and the PKK changed in 2011 with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and civil war. The United States needed a militia in the northeast region to control oil and gas fields and block the regime’s economic resources. The SDF consisted of three elements: fighters linked to the PKK who were Iranian or Turkish nationals, Syrian Kurds, and desert Arab tribal confederations seeking support against ISIS. The United States saw this alliance as an important pillar of its influence, consolidating its positions in eastern Syria and western Iraq.[7]

After Assad’s fall, Arab Sunnis took over the government. Ahmed Hussein al-Sar’s primary goal is to unify Syria and cooperate with the West on various economic and regional political issues. Arab tribal confederations support unity, and their Arab identity has made them allies of the new regime. Kurdish separatism, represented by the SDF, has undermined its own political project, and without the support of Arab tribes, its military forces are no longer effective. This explains their rapid collapse following the invasion by government forces and the Turkish units supporting them. Turkey, which helped es-Sar come to power in 2025, reached an agreement with the PKK in Turkey to renounce violence and integrate as Turkish citizens. Turkey would never allow the Syrian branch of the PKK to establish a mini-state in northern Syria, near the Turkish border. For Washington, the role of the new Syrian leadership is much more important than that of the Kurds, on whom it relied during the war. A Syria that maintains balanced relations with Turkey, makes peace with Israel, and whose economy is supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar serves American hegemony in the Middle East. The Syrian government offers cultural and political rights to Syrian Kurds, so the only force encouraging the SDF to continue fighting is the PKK, which also operates in Iran and is considered a terrorist organisation by the US and Turkey. US Special Envoy Tom Barrack says the SDF’s time is up, and the Kurds can now integrate into Syrian society.[8]

Although the SDF feels that the United States has betrayed the Kurds, Kurdish autonomy or independence in northeastern Syria has never been on the agenda for demographic and geopolitical reasons. The economic importance of the area means that no central government would accept the secession of this region. Most Syrians support the unity of Syria, which makes it strategically impossible for the Kurds to fight this war. ISIS fighters, most of whom are Iraqi or hold European passports (i.e., they are not Syrian), were transported to Iraqi prisons. On 18 January, the SDF signed an integration agreement with the Syrian government, which favors Syrian Kurds but not the PKK. The areas bordering Iraq are gradually returning to the control of Arab tribes and the Syrian government. The US is now preparing for war with Iran and its militias, so all geopolitical factors point towards the elimination of the SDF. [9]

The significance of events in Europe

Clashes between Arab and Kurdish immigrants confirm that migration is a means of spreading imported conflicts across European societies. Turkey’s policy towards Syrian Kurds led to similar clashes between Indians and Pakistanis in Germany, Austria, Belgium and France in 2019,[10] and in the United Kingdom in connection with the 2025 war between India and Pakistan.[11] In recent years, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has had an increasing impact on European societies.[12] Almost every major conflict in the Middle East can spread to Europe, where more than a million Syrian migrants live. Moves related to Syria offer the latest example of imported geopolitics.

These clashes are also significant in terms of political loyalty. As long as immigrants regularly visit their home countries and follow political developments there, they cannot detach themselves from their ethnic and religious backgrounds. Furthermore, migrants are susceptible to news that stirs up emotions and destabilising influences, as they generally follow the media and social media of their countries of origin. This can prevent them from becoming loyal citizens in their new country. Moreover, many young people with immigrant backgrounds are easy targets for militant groups, which recruit them as terrorists or fighters to deploy in the Middle East or to provide logistical and financial support, while the young people are unable to critically interpret the strategic goals of the recruiters. Over the years, the PKK has also built up a broad network of supporters among European immigrants. [13]

Summary

From a European perspective, the spread of crises in the Middle East poses a threat to public safety and could become a source of terrorism. Beyond that, the current tensions between Syrian Arabs and Kurds due to the conflict in northeastern Syria have again raised serious concerns about the prospects for the integration of migrants. These clashes raise important questions about political loyalty (or loyalties), how far these loyalties can extend, and whether they can be surrendered in the interests of citizenship, given that many migrants are now European citizens or are seeking to become so. Militant political organisations and countries of origin can easily exploit ethnic or religious loyalties brought from the country of origin to destabilise the West.

How are the events in Syria affecting European migrant communities?

Syrian government forces retook most of the northern areas previously controlled by the Kurdish-led SDF in early 2026. This has led to violent clashes between Syrian Arab and Kurdish groups in several European countries.

What is “imported conflict” in Europe?

“Imported conflict” means that immigrants bring along political and ethnic conflicts from their home countries to the receiving country.
This increases risks to public order and can weaken social inclusion.

What is the social context of the Kurdish protests?

Participants in the protests are typically:

• young men,
• migrants who have been granted asylum,
• some of them have links to the PKK,
• often active on social media and extremist networks.

This facilitates radicalisation and political mobilisation.

The PKK:

• follows a Marxist-Leninist ideology,
• has a strong network in Europe,
• is actively engaged in online propaganda,
• is classified as a terrorist organisation in several countries.

Narrative:

• The West has deceived them by asking for their help in fighting ISIS while failing to support their independence efforts.

Why has the role of the US in Syria changed?

Previously, the United States supported the SDF in the fight against ISIS.
In the current geopolitical situation, however:

• the role of Turkey has become more important,
• Washington supports a united Syria,
• Kurdish autonomy has been pushed into the background.

This contributed to the rapid weakening of the SDF.

Why is Kurdish autonomy unrealistic?

• the region is of key economic importance,
• the majority of the population is Arab,
• the central government would not allow secession,
• the Syrian economy would not function without the region.

Therefore, independence is not geopolitically feasible.

What risk does this pose for Europe?

The impact of the Syrian conflict in Europe:

• increasing street violence,
• deteriorating public order,
• weakening integration,
• the risk of radicalisation,
• dominance of media in the country of origin
• recruitment opportunities for terrorist networks.

There are more than one million Syrian migrants in Europe, increasing the risk of contagion.

How does this affect political loyalty?

Many immigrants:

• continue to follow the policies of their countries of origin,
• consume the media there,
• are emotionally attached to their old communities.

This can hinder full attachment to the receiving country.

What is the main conclusion of the study?

The study shows that

• conflicts in the Middle East have a direct impact on Europe,
• threaten social stability,
• weaken integration,
• and pose a long-term security risk.

The interconnection between migration and geopolitics is a growing factor in Europe.