Danish urban policy and migration

Since 2010, Denmark has drawn up a so-called “ghetto list” every year, based on criteria such as higher than average unemployment and crime rates, lower than average educational attainment and a high proportion of first- or second-generation immigrants.^[1] In our analysis, we first present the political background, then present data on migration and urban policy in Denmark, followed by Danish governmental measures related to migrant ghettos, and finally examine the applicability of Danish migration and urban policy to the wider European context.

Background

Denmark’s immigration and integration policy has changed in several steps over the past decades. By 1980, immigrants made up 2.6% of Denmark’s population. The liberal Asylum and Immigration Act of 1983 broadened the eligibility to apply for and be granted asylum. The law also guaranteed the right of immigrants to family reunification, extending it to children under 18 and parents over 60. This liberal legislation has fundamentally changed the demographics of the country. After three decades, in 2018, 10.2% of the population were first-generation immigrants and 3.1% second-generation immigrants.

In 1998, the first law on the integration of immigrants was adopted, which focused on integration into the labour market while reducing welfare benefits. However, the law was in conflict with EU rules, and the government was forced to repeal it in 2000.^[2]

After the change of government in 2001, when the Danish People’s Party became a dominant player, supporting the parliamentary faction of the centre-right cabinet, which was in a minority, it succeeded in increasing the focus on immigration and tightening up regulations. First, elderly parents living in their country of origin were excluded from family reunification, and then it was made a requirement that immigrants’ commitment to Denmark should be at least as strong as their loyalty to their country of origin. They have made it easier to work in Denmark in certain priority professions, but at the same time they have broken with the classic principle of unconditional welfare benefits and introduced a new system for non-EU and non-Scandinavian immigrants.

In response to the 2015-2016 European migration crisis, eligibility for refugee status was further restricted. The measures, which the Danish People’s Party calls a paradigm shift, in fact stress that the goal regarding refugees is not integration, but that they should return home as soon as possible. The benefit they receive was renamed from integration benefit to “repatriation benefit”. For those who do stay, obtaining Danish nationality is becoming increasingly difficult.

While in Sweden citizenship is seen as a catalyst or starting point for integration, in Denmark citizenship is seen as a reward for successful integration, which immigrants can only receive once they have proven that they are fully integrated. The emphasis on integration, mainly through employment, has been complemented by strong expectations for immigrants to not only learn about, but actively demonstrate their commitment to Danish norms and values. The latest element of the naturalisation requirements is the handshake with the mayor of the municipality of registration, linked to the solemn oath of citizenship. The requirement to shake hands after signing the loyalty pledge is explicitly designed to filter out conservative Muslims who reject integration.^[3]

The Social Democratic Party, which is currently in government, also pursues a restrictive policy, so there is a cross-party consensus on migration. Norms based on democratic and liberal principles, such as gender equality and freedoms, are treated as part of the national culture. Typically citing higher crime rates and lower employment rates among people from immigrant backgrounds, they stress that integration challenges are ongoing and affect all generations of immigrants. The consensus on immigration is driving parties to compete on toughening, and this is unique in Western Europe.^[4] The restrictive policy has been made possible by the fact that the Danish legislature only partially follows EU standards, with some laws having clauses amending their validity. This also allows for the possibility of delegating the processing of asylum applications to third countries, i.e. transit countries. The official Danish position is that the countries hosting the assessment process are Denmark’s partners, which are themselves involved in curbing migration. In return, Denmark is launching a targeted scholarship programme for partner countries to facilitate legal migration, while also placing a strong emphasis on development cooperation.

In Denmark, this restrictive policy is currently embodied by Mattias Tesfaye, who has African roots. According to Tesfaye, who was Minister for Immigration and Integration from 2019 to 2022, the majority of asylum seekers in Europe are young men, one in two of whom are not considered eligible in any way, i.e. vulnerable. The half-Ethiopian integration minister, citing his own experience, stresses that the main victims of integration failure are low-income and poorly educated people, the indigenous lower middle class and immigrants themselves; toughening therefore benefits society as a whole.^[5]

Denmark also has a uniquely strong position in Western Europe in the context of integration and the practice of religion. The Danes believe that mass migration precludes integration, as the adoption of culture is a priority, and a time-consuming and costly process. Cultural integration is above all a willingness to live according to democratic values, to accept the equality of men and women and the primacy of the rule of law. This includes the recognition that religion is not above the law and cannot be a tool for changing society. Children and young people have the right to practise their religion according to their own convictions and to marry whoever they want. In 2021, a law was passed that prohibits religious institutions from accepting money from individuals, organisations or governments whose aims do not meet the Danish criteria for transparency or do not operate according to the principles of democracy. The entry of Islamist preachers with extremist views has been banned for years.^[6]

Current data and trends

Denmark is home to 566,477 immigrants of non-Western ancestry and their descendants, which currently represents 10% of the total population. These migrants come mainly from Turkey, North Africa and the Middle East. The Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Europe account for less than half (275,575) of the immigrants. The Middle East (Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon) and Turkey account for the relative majority (290,902 people). The statistic is remarkable, given the small and dispersed immigrant communities, despite the fact that the overall rate of 10% is one of the highest in Europe. The number of Turkish immigrants is estimated at 65,429,^[7] and there are 12 other immigrant communities of non-Western origin, with a population of between 17,000 and 53,000.^[8]

According to Larsen and Hansen, three interlocking trends have shaped Danish urban policy over the past twenty years. Firstly, the growth approach has replaced the redistributive approach in urban policy priorities. Secondly, urban policy has led to a shift in perspective from a primarily “inward” to an “outward” one. Thirdly, the public sector has adopted entrepreneurial forms of organisation and behaviour, while private companies are more involved in decision-making.^[9] Grünenberg and Freieslebe argue that Danish urban policy has focused on a particular interpretation of the interplay between notions of social cohesion, physical location and “ethnic cultural otherness”.^[10]

And Hans Thor Andersen argues that urban policy in Denmark shows the current dominance of the market, which is undergoing significant changes; urban policy now strongly believes in limiting the power of central government, relies on the market to solve urban renewal problems, and is clearly shifting towards viewing socially deprived neighbourhoods as zones for ethnic minorities (with immigrant backgrounds). Urban policy is moving away from a welfare approach towards “fire-fighting”, i.e. addressing the immediate, obvious problems of each area while ignoring their root causes.^[11] In other words, as housing is increasingly determined by the market rather than by the welfare state (social housing), Andersen’s critique is that Danish urban policy tends to elevate lower-class neighbourhoods, especially those inhabited by immigrants, to the middle class. Meanwhile, it fails to create the necessary conditions for the majority of immigrants to become middle-class citizens—either because they do not have the resources or skills to join the middle class, or because no society can avoid the gap between the middle and lower classes.

The Danish social experiment

In 2023, the Danish government designated 43 low-income areas across the country as “ghettos” (17 in 2022). Since 2010, Denmark has compiled a “ghetto list” every year, based on criteria that clearly indicate social problems, including higher than average unemployment and crime rates, lower than average educational attainment—all in an area populated mostly by first or second generation immigrants. In 2020, the government announced an experimental solution: mass evictions and rebuilding to tackle these neighbourhoods, which it sees as irreversible urban disasters. The original plan affects 11,000 tenants in social housing.^[12]

When assessing the political decision to evict and rebuild, two crucial factors must be taken into account. One is that non-Western immigration to Denmark is a relatively new phenomenon, which started to increase in the late 1980s. This indicates that the first generation of immigrants constitutes the majority of the population with a migrant background. This is in contrast to other nations, such as France, where the third or even fourth generation is significant due to continued immigration, family reunification and a much higher propensity to have children than in the host society. Secondly, the first generation of immigrants is generally satisfied with the conditions in their host country, as Denmark is a prosperous welfare state with one of the best living standards in the world. In other words, Denmark largely meets the expectations of most first generation immigrants. The difference between Sweden and Denmark, for example, is that Denmark has never had an urban riot, while Sweden has had several recently, due to the dissatisfaction of the country’s second-generation immigrants with their social situation.

Over the past twenty years, Denmark has responded to urban degradation with various official urban plans in some vulnerable, low-employment and higher crime residential areas. Regardless of the political party in power, a political consensus on urban policy has emerged in the country, leading Denmark to make a major effort to address the situation and improve social housing for immigrant communities. The term “ghetto” was officially used between 2010 and 2021 to refer to some or all of the areas at risk, particularly in the western suburbs of Copenhagen, but was dropped in 2021 due to its strong negative connotations. The Danish government’s measures have focused on the conversion of vulnerable neighbourhoods into private housing and on education (long-term language programmes, teaching Danish culture, etc.). At this point, governments have intervened in the development of the ghetto and improved some of its features. This does not mean that immigrants are not over-represented in some places. The social and cultural divide between immigrant communities and the host society is difficult to close, even with careful reordering. The inevitability of economic, norm and status differences remains the root cause of the problem.

According to official statistics, Denmark’s restrictive immigration policy and strict integration criteria have led to a decrease in crime rates, an increase in the participation rate in education and employment, and a decrease in the number of areas classified as ghettos.^[13] At the same time, Larsen and Hansen have shown that Danish urban policy tries to address the problem of ghettos by urban renewal with middle-class residents following the dynamics of the real estate market. Although this process is gradual, it illustrates how the interaction between the state and the market has a “traumatic” effect on communities and the city.^[14]

Applicability of the Danish model

Four key lessons can be drawn from Danish urban policy. Firstly, immigrants cannot be “housed” in welfare states. While Denmark first embraced social housing policy, it soon turned to market-oriented housing, which means that the development of a middle class from an immigrant background replaces social assistance. Welfare programmes have led to expensive sustainability problems that end up being borne by the state. Secondly, urban planning is a technical solution, it only deals with the territorial issue: it does not address the social and cultural difference between immigrants and the host society. Thirdly, the spatial dimension of social polarisation cannot be overlooked. Different social customs, backgrounds and financial levels contribute to divisions within society, making it impossible to control space harmoniously. Since the housing market determines house prices, the spatial concentration of higher-income private homeowners contrasts with the spatial concentration of lower-income households and low-income communities.  Fourthly, if the state acts to protect the poorer classes by providing social housing, the immigrant underclass will build parallel societies, while if the state gives these places to the property market, polarisation will deepen. It is difficult for states to distinguish between socialism and neoliberalism as they each have their own disadvantages. While socialism superficially eliminates the real division of society as a whole, market-driven spatial organisation marginalises the low-income population.

In summary, the cultural, social and economic gap between immigrants and the host society is well documented. So bringing in immigrants also means bringing in a social class, the vast majority of which cannot afford to live in a middle-class urban area. A market-based restructuring of the spatial structure presupposes higher incomes, which in turn presuppose a comprehensive programme of educational, social and cultural integration. This model, which is also causing social shock in Denmark, is no longer applicable in Western European countries where second and third generation immigrants predominate and where living standards are lower than in Denmark.