Iran and the Shia-Sunni power struggle in the Middle East

The role of Shia-Sunni confrontation in Middle Eastern geopolitics up to 2003

The Shia-Sunni divide dates back to the 7^th century, when Muslims fought civil wars over proper governance and legitimacy. This is therefore a political conflict that was later dressed up as a religious-sectarian one. Sunnis and Shias lived peacefully together during certain periods of history, while at other times they fought violently against each other. Another conflict undermining the Islamic empires of the Middle East was between the Arabs and the Persians. In the 16^th century, the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) transformed Iran from a Sunni-majority country into a Shia state, thus adding a sectarian dimension to Iran’s geopolitics and ethnic (Persian-Arab) dimension. They first exploited this new geopolitical identity in their rivalry with the Ottoman Empire. Iran’s Shia-Persian identity has remained intact despite successive dynasties, and since 1979, following the Islamic Revolution, this identity has become even more pronounced.[1]

Three factors exacerbated the Shia-Sunni conflict in the 1980s. First, Iran attempted to export its revolution to countries with Shia minorities in the Middle East, such as Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf states (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait). In addition, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) pitted Khomeini’s Iran (Shiite and Persian) against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Arab nationalist), claiming millions of lives and resulting in the destruction of both countries. Eventually, the conflict did not produce a clear outcome, but it shook both Iraq and Iran. In order to consolidate its legitimacy, the Iranian regime has put its regional ambitions back on the agenda. Finally, in line with US policy in Afghanistan, which aimed to defeat the Soviet Union and contain communism, Saudi Arabia used its financial resources and mobilisation capabilities to elevate Salafism, an extreme form of Sunni Islam, to a regional and global ideology. As a result, political Shiism and its Sunni Salafist counterpart became increasingly influential in the 1990s and continued to be mobilized as key ideologies in the Middle East until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.[2]

Shiite-Sunni power struggles in the Middle East (since 2003)

The Shia-Sunni power struggle in the Middle East took on a new dimension in 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq. Iran and the Iraqi Shia leadership, which was effectively under Iran’s tight control, offered to cooperate with the Americans in overthrowing Saddam’s regime, which had until then relied on Arab Sunnis in Iraq. The US took full advantage of the division between Sunnis and Shias, initially relying on the Shias to maintain its presence in Iraq and stabilise its control over the oil fields. However, the persecution and exclusion of Iraqi Sunnis led to the radicalisation of Sunni regions in western Iraq and the spread of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which eventually became ISIS. The bloodshed caused by Shia militias and al-Qaeda/ISIS has made reconciliation difficult, undermining US control over Iraq. The Shia-Sunni conflict reached its most destructive phase between 2003 and 2017, when Iran extended its influence to Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.[3]

Shia Muslims are in the majority in Iraq (60% of the population) and in the minority in Yemen (65% Sunni, 35% Shia), Lebanon (41% Christian, 26% Shia, and 26% Sunni), and Syria (80% Sunni). Nevertheless, with the help of massive financial support and arms supplies from Iranian militias, these Shia minorities have gained real power in these three countries. In addition, during the Obama administration (2008–2016), the United States approved Iran’s growing influence, which also benefited Shia forces in the Middle East. In December 2024, the Sunnis regained power in Syria, while Israel ended Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon with its war against the organisation in the same year. Iran continues to exert significant influence in northwestern Yemen (through the Shia Houthis) and Iraq. The Sunni states in the region have avoided involvement in the Iraqi conflict and support the US presence in the country to counterbalance Iran’s influence. However, Sunni states, especially Saudi Arabia, are concerned about Yemen. 65% of Yemen’s population is Sunni, and the Gulf states are cooperating with Israel and the United States to overthrow the Houthi militia, which is led by Iranian generals and armed with Iranian weapons.[4]

The Arab states of the Middle East between Iran and Israel

Before the Islamic revolution of 1979, the Arab-Israeli conflict did not pose a threat to Arab regimes and the internal dynamics of Arab societies, especially after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1979 and the Oslo Accords of 1993. The Gulf states were not even in direct conflict with Israel. Iran, however, was considered a direct and existential threat, as it wanted to spread the Shia Islamic revolution to neighboring Arab governments.[5]

Currently, we must distinguish between two factions among the Arab states of the Middle East with regard to their relations with Israel and Iran: the first is the faction allied with Israel and in confrontation with Iran, represented by the United Arab Emirates, which shares the view that Iran poses a strategic threat. The United Arab Emirates and Iran share extensive maritime borders. In 1971, Iran occupied three islands in the Gulf, which remain the subject of territorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates and Iran to this day. The economic center of the Emirates, Dubai, and the security of its oil exports are threatened by the Iranian navy. That is why the United Arab Emirates and Israel signed the Abraham Accords and developed strategic defense cooperation.[6]

The second faction supports conditional normalisation and includes Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar (with Kuwait and Oman leaning towards it) These countries see Iran as a strategic threat but believe that normalisation with Israel is impossible without the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of territorial disputes. These countries share Turkey’s position, which makes them Turkey’s objective allies, although they would remain neutral in a confrontation between Iran and Israel. An American-Israeli victory would lead to the new status quo being accepted without reservation. Despite Islamic and Arab rhetoric on the Palestinian issue, geopolitics in the Middle East, like in any other region, follows realpolitik. The main goal of the oil-producing countries in the Gulf region is stability and military defence, so that they can preserve their wealth and security. Reliance on the US is crucial in this regard, but Israel appears to be more committed to fighting Iran than the Americans are. Therefore, in the faction of conditional normalisation, Israel is sometimes mentioned as a potential partner and sometimes as an adversary.[7]

What does Iran want?

Iran’s primary goal is to be recognised as a regional power in the Middle East. This means that it must exert influence over most Arab states stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran cannot expand northward because Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey oppose such efforts, nor can it expand eastward because Afghanistan and Pakistan prevent such attempts, despite the fact that both countries have Shia minorities. The weakest link is the Arab countries of the Middle East, where Shia minorities live and where the army is relatively weak. This expansion was hampered by the 1980–1988 war between Iraq and Iran, but Iranian ambitions have accelerated since the 1990s, especially following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In order to continue its geopolitical expansion, Iran has opted for military support from militias, as its economic power is too weak to secure its influence—unlike Saudi Arabia, which is an economic superpower but a military dwarf. Iran has therefore developed a nuclear programme, drones and missile systems to create a deterrent and threat that fits in with the proxy wars going on in the region and to assert itself as a regional power.[8]

Iran’s geopolitical ambitions did not pose a threat to the United States, which for years viewed Iran as a manageable country that could be used in Obama’s “creative chaos” strategy. Initially, Iran’s expansion in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza posed a threat to the United States’ allies and vassals in the region, particularly Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states. Iran’s military buildup and development of nuclear and ballistic missiles threatened Israel’s security. Turkey was concerned that Iran controlled the Assad regime in Syria and was willing to cooperate with Israel and the Gulf states to overthrow Assad. The security of the Gulf states and trade in the Red Sea were threatened by Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran became a problem for the United States when it joined the Russia-China axis, helped Russia in Ukraine, and supported Hamas in preparing for the attacks on October 7.[9]

For years, the United States hoped that Iran would break away from Russia and China and become a US vassal, but because the Iranian leadership pursued its own goals, this did not happen. The 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian commander coordinating Shia militias in the Middle East, clearly demonstrates the United States’ growing concern about Iranian expansion. Six months after Trump began his second term in office, the United States bombed Iran during the 12-day war, signaling that the Americans had changed their strategy toward Iran: instead of negotiations, they chose confrontation.[10]

Iran’s weakness and the prospects for regime change

The first weakness of the Iranian regime is the obsolescence of its system based on political Islam, which is founded on the theocratic rule of a religious leader. In other words, Gulf governments have abandoned their Salafi ideology for pragmatism and neoliberal policies, while Arab nationalism has failed in Syria and Iraq. Iran’s Islamism and Shiism are the last bastions of ideologies that emerged during the Cold War in the Middle East. Another significant weakness of the Iranian regime is the economic crisis, which is one of the main reasons for the outbreak of protests in 2025–2026. Contrary to its promises, the Islamic revolution did not bring the expected economic results, and the country’s structural economic disaster, which has been ongoing since 1979, has never been resolved. The Revolutionary Guard’s state economy resembles a milder version of socialism, which has failed globally and led to high inflation, corruption, and rising living costs. However, Iran’s greatest vulnerability is its ethnic demographics. The Persian element (51% of the population) forms the basis of the state and the system, while significant minorities, comprising half of the population (Azerbaijani Turks 24%, Gilaks and Mazanderanis 8%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Lurs 2%, Baluchis 2%, and Turkmens 2%) are marginalised. These minorities are concentrated in western and northern Iran, which has the country’s richest oil reserves and borders Iran’s enemies, Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan.[11]

Despite its weaknesses, the Revolutionary Guard and Shia religious leaders continue to wield power over the state and are prepared to do whatever it takes to maintain it. Regime change will probably not be easy, as the Persians and the Shia Revolutionary Guard will opt for full-scale conflict in order to preserve their privileges. With a population of 92 million (twice that of Iraq’s 46 million),[12] if Iran collapses, it will pose a huge problem for the region.

A democratic and civil system that abandons its threats against Israel and the Arab states, includes minorities, and promotes Iran’s economic development is the best solution for the region. However, overthrowing the Iranian government could be just as costly and destructive as it was to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It is unlikely that the Iranian regime will undertake a process of reform, democratisation and secularisation and begin to treat economic prosperity as a priority. Therefore, American-Israeli attacks, protests by minorities, and the regime’s response could lead to civil war or collapse in Iran.[13]

Summary

In the US-China conflict, which is perhaps the most important issue in global politics, Iran’s oil reserves represent a strategic advantage. For Israel and the Arab states in the Middle East, regime change would be the optimal solution, as it could put an end to Iran’s ballistic and nuclear threats, as well as the Shia militias that are destabilising the region. The United States would negotiate and ensure the survival of the Islamic regime in Iran if it agreed to become America’s vassal, which is why Washington is more patient than its allies and vassals in the Middle East. However, the war between Iran and Israel that broke out in June 2025 exposed the weaknesses of the Iranian government. The protests in Iran have also highlighted the economic and political failures of the Islamic Republic, as well as discrimination against ethnic minorities. The Iranian regime has made too many enemies, both internal and external, so a second war between Iran and Israel would seriously threaten its survival.

Summary – Iran and the power struggles between Shia and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East

What is happening in the Middle East?
Iran is seeking regional dominance through its Shia proxy network, which Israel, the US and Sunni Arab states are trying to counter with increasing force.

What’s at stake?

• maintaining regional stability
• securing oil and trade routes
• maintaining the global balance of power
• formation of a new world order

Why is Iran back in the spotlight?

Iran’s geopolitical importance has increased dramatically due to the 2025 war between Israel and Iran, social protests within the country, and the escalation of proxy wars in the Middle East. Iran’s regional power ambitions directly threaten the stability of the Middle East.

What key factors influence the current situation?

• Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities
• Shia proxy militias: In Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen
• Nuclear programme
• Growing resistance from Israel, the US and Sunni Arab states
• Strategic cooperation between Russia and China

What is the historical background to the divide between Shia and Sunni Muslims?

The conflict was not religious in nature, but rather a political power struggle that arose in the 7^th century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad over the legitimacy of leadership. Religion has become a tool of geopolitical rivalry.

Why is Iran dangerous for Israel, Turkey and the Arab states?

For Israel:

• ballistic missiles
• nuclear threat
• The immediate military threat posed by Hezbollah

For Gulf States:

• threat to maritime trade
• Yemeni Houthi attacks
• vulnerability of energy exports

For Turkey:

• loss of influence in Syria
• decline in regional importance

What does Iran really want?

Main objective: Regional hegemony from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea.

Strategic tools:

• Shia militias
• missile technology
• drone warfare
• nuclear developments

Where is the Iranian regime weak?

Ideological obsolescence

• theocratic system, a state operated according to religious principles
• lack of political modernisation, human rights abuses

Collapse of the economy

• inflation
• corruption
• livelihood crisis