politics

The Syrian government’s takeover of the northeastern regions of the country in January–February 2026, the elimination of camps housing ISIS fighters and their families, and the withdrawal of US forces from these regions have created a new situation and security threat. The prisoners and their families have been transferred to Iraq, and Baghdad is now asking more than 61 countries to take back their citizens. The Iraqi government does not want to deal with foreigners and only takes responsibility for Iraqi ISIS members. Among the prisoners and their families are hundreds of Western citizens. This analysis discusses two Western responses to the repatriation of ISIS members and their families. We also look at the likelihood of ISIS terrorism returning to Europe in the coming years. As history shows, one of the main reasons for terrorist activities is the return of jihadists.

The 2026 survey in Project Europe, like in previous years, aimed to map public attitudes towards the most important public issues affecting our continent. The latest survey goes beyond a wide range of current issues to focus on the perception of European and national identity, the livelihood challenges Europeans face, and the transformation of social and political processes in the wake of a global system change. Among the catalysts for these processes are the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war, the assessment of the EU leadership’s performance, and the transformation of Europe’s relationship with the major powers.

In Syria, the past few weeks have seen the new Sunni Arab government’s forces capture most of the territory previously controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the north and northeast of the country. In response to military operations against Syrian Kurds, Syrian Arabs and Kurds clashed on European streets in Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom in mid-January. These clashes were the first that clearly erupted because of the new balance of power in Syria and disrupted public order in Europe. Until recently, the radical manifesto of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) mobilised Kurds in Europe, but now the latest military operation in Syria is stirring up emotions. This study describes the background to these clashes, their impact on European migration dynamics, and the risks and challenges they pose to integration.

With social unrest intensifying in Iran and a second war between Israel and Iran becoming increasingly likely, Iran and the Shia-Sunni power struggle in the Middle East have once again become the focus of attention in regional and global politics. The first Iran-Israel war (13-24 June 2025) weakened the Iranian regime but did not threaten its survival, especially its arsenal of ballistic missiles. Iran's second strategic asset, beyond missiles, is the Shia militias in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, which also survived the 2025 attacks and can continue to play a role in the region’s power struggles. First, we need to understand the divide between Sunnis and Shias, its background and current role in Middle Eastern geopolitics, and how it influences the current power struggles between Shias and Sunnis in the Middle East. In light of this, we will then discuss Iran’s ambitions and who is threatened by Iran's expansion. Lastly, we will examine the possibilities for regime change in Iran. The United States and Israel are not the only countries that support regime change in Iran; countries such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Sunni Arab states (the Gulf states, Jordan, and Syria) would also benefit from it. For the United States, a war against Iran or a regime change, if it were to occur, would make the US the only significant player in the region, thereby minimising the influence of the Russian-Chinese axis on oil and Middle East politics.

The Brussels regulation banning Russian oil and gas not only violates EU laws and the sovereignty of Member States but also runs counter to the expectations of Europeans. According to a recent survey by Századvég, the relative majority of EU citizens do not support a total embargo. In Hungary, the rejection rate is 62%.

On 17 February 2026, the Petőfi Literary Museum hosted a conference organised by the Századvég Foundation with the title “What’s the situation? – The West and politics after liberalism”, which focused on the current state of liberalism and the future of the Western political structure.

More than two-thirds of EU citizens believe that the Community’s global competitiveness is declining. The economic downturn is also affecting households’ daily lives: one-third of Europeans are struggling to make ends meet.

Which politician will not allow Hungary to be dragged into war, and who can preserve peace? Századvég’s February survey sought answers to these questions. The majority (52%) believe that Viktor Orbán would not allow Hungary to be drawn into war and that he would be able to maintain peace. Only 36% assume the same about Péter Magyar. When asked which politician, the prime minister or his challenger, Hungarians consider a risky choice, and which one they are unsure about in terms of what would happen if he led the country, the answer was also clear. 54% of Hungarians consider Péter Magyar a risky choice and do not know what direction he would take the country in. Only 39% of people see Viktor Orbán’s political direction as risky.

Brussels would admit Ukraine to the EU as early as 2027, before it has fulfilled the accession criteria. According to a recent survey by Századvég, three quarters of EU citizens reject the initiative. Most of them are concerned that the integration of Ukraine would worsen the situation of EU farmers, increase crime, weaken food safety and reduce development funding.

The Patriots have submitted a motion of no confidence against the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. 53% of Hungarians have an unfavourable opinion of the German politician, so the Hungarian MEPs who do not support the motion are siding with Brussels against Hungarians.

Although the Brussels elite is pushing for an increase in arms shipments and would like to send soldiers to Ukraine, European citizens do not agree with these efforts. A new survey by Századvég shows that 51% of EU citizens reject the former, while 69% reject the latter.

Nigeria has reached a critical turning point, the consequences of which are profound not only for West Africa and the Sahel region, but also for European security policy, energy diversification, and migration management. As Africa’s most populous nation and largest economy, Nigeria’s internal dynamics (demographic, political and economic) extend far beyond its borders. However, this regional power is under increasing pressure, threatening to destabilise both the country itself and the wider Sahel region, particularly in a region where Western influence has been dramatically reduced in recent years following the geopolitical transformation of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

On 11 November 2025, the European Commission published its first annual report on asylum and migration in Europe, which aims to present the progress made in implementing the new pact on migration and asylum that will come into force in 2026. The long-awaited and delayed report raises more questions than it answers regarding the direction of migration management in the EU. The document covered the three main pillars of the EU’s immigration policy (responsibility, solidarity, and return) without making any significant progress in these areas. It welcomed the 35% drop in illegal border crossings, without pointing out that this drop was due to the restrictive policy applied at the gateway to the Balkans. Furthermore, it ignored Hungary’s contribution, which is essential to reducing the number of illegal border crossings on the Balkan route. In this analysis, we look at these elements of the report in detail.

After Brussels’ preparations for war reached a new level, the Tisza Party raised the possibility of reinstating conscription. The move has met with significant public resistance: 80% of Hungarians reject the measure.

Every year, millions of migrants (illegal immigrants, students, workers and new holders of family reunification visas) arrive in Europe, increasing the demand for housing and consequently the cost of housing for European citizens. Most analysts identify a number of factors that have led to the current crisis. However, they agree that migration is a significant factor that has made the situation worse. Ultimately, Europe’s lower and middle classes are bearing the cost of this crisis, while rental property owners are benefiting from rising demand for homes and rising rents. European governments no longer invest in housing and have no strategy for accommodating the millions of migrants arriving in waves since 2015. In this context, rising homelessness and mounting integration challenges are becoming increasingly apparent and serious in major cities across Western Europe. In this analysis, we briefly describe what research has found about the relationship between migration and the housing crisis, and then illustrate the links between migration and the housing crisis using the examples of two countries: the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The majority of EU citizens find it unacceptable that Brussels is steering the EU away from its dependence on Russian natural gas towards a more expensive dependence on American gas. Rejection of the transition is highest in Hungary and Bulgaria, at 73%.

Sweden, once a “model humanitarian state”, has now become a victim of its own migration policy: one-third of the population is no longer ethnically Swedish, the country has 59 no-go zones, and, after Albania, it has the highest number of gang-related deaths in Europe. In 2023, the Swedish government was forced to radically change its policy, reducing the number of asylum seekers from 163,000 to 9,000, while offering USD 34,000 in support to those who voluntarily return home.

Tisza included Brussels’ goal of banning Russian energy in its programme. The measure would impose heavy costs on all Hungarians, and is therefore rejected by two-thirds of adults. However, the ban divides political camps: while 59% of Tisza voters support it, 96% of Fidesz-KDNP voters reject the move.